

# TEACHERS MANUALS

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By PROF. JOHN DEWEY

AND

**The Demands of Sociology  
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By PROF. ALBION W. SMALL

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PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY

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
## The Demands of Sociology Upon Pedagogy

BY

PROFESSOR ALBION W. SMALL



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## PREFACE.

THE isolation of the teacher is a thing of the past. The processes of education have come to be recognized as fundamental and vital in any attempt to improve human conditions and elevate society.

The missionary and social reformer have long been looking to education for counsel and aid in their most difficult undertakings. They have viewed with interest and pleasure the broadening of pedagogy so as to make it include not only experimental physiology and child-study, but the problems of motor training, physical culture, hygiene, and the treatment of defectives and delinquents of every class.

The schoolmaster, always conservative, has not found it easy to enter this large field; for he has often failed to realize how rich and fruitful the result of such researches are; but remarkable progress has been made, and a changed attitude on the part of educators is the result. And how could it be otherwise when the oldest and most renowned institutions of learning in the land are giving a conspicuous place to the newer and better pedagogy in their curriculum?

Another, and perhaps the latest, phase of the educational movement is the conviction that the school is a social institution, that its aims are social, and that its management, discipline, and method of instruction should



be dominated by this idea. The mere contemplation of the proposition must be accompanied in the mind of every candid person by a sense of our shortcomings in this respect.

The two articles presented herewith seem to set forth this subject in such terms and to give it such illumination as to make them worthy of wide circulation, not only among the teachers, but the parents of the land.

Dr. Dewey's Pedagogical Creed shows how the concentrated agencies of the school should bring the child to share in the inherited resources of the race. It points out how discipline and method should be influenced to this end.

The article by Dr. Small is a trenchant exposition of the principle that education should direct its attention to sociology, and learn what the work of reality demands of the teacher. It is a fresher and better statement than has yet appeared of the old dictum that education should fit the child for his environment.

These two articles constitute an excellent text-book in pedagogy for advanced teachers, and, if conscientiously studied, our schools will come to be "not merely leaders of children, but makers of society."

SAMUEL T. DUTTON,

Supt. of Schools.

BROOKLINE, MASS.

# MY PEDAGOGIC CREED.

By Professor JOHN DEWEY.

## ARTICLE I. WHAT EDUCATION IS.

I BELIEVE that all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race. This process begins unconsciously almost at birth, and is continually shaping the individual's powers, saturating his consciousness, forming his habits, training his ideas, and arousing his feelings and emotions. Through this unconscious education the individual gradually comes to share in the intellectual and moral resources which humanity has succeeded in getting together. He becomes an inheritor of the funded capital of civilization. The most formal and technical education in the world cannot safely depart from this general process. It can only organize it; or differentiate it in some particular direction.

I believe that the only true education comes through the stimulation of the child's powers by the demands of the social situations in which he finds himself. Through these demands he is stimulated to act as a member of a unity, to emerge from his original narrowness of action and feeling, and to conceive of himself from the standpoint of the welfare of the group to which he belongs. Through the responses which others make to his own activities he comes to know what these mean in social terms. The value which they have is reflected back into them. For instance, through the response which is made to the child's instinctive babblings the child comes to know what those babblings mean; they are transformed into articulate language, and thus the child is introduced

into the consolidated wealth of ideas and emotions which are now summed up in language.

I believe that this educational process has two sides—one psychological and one sociological; and that neither can be subordinated to the other or neglected without evil results following. Of these two sides, the psychological is the basis. The child's own instincts and powers furnish the material and give the starting-point for all education. Save as the efforts of the educator connect with some activity which the child is carrying on of his own initiative independent of the educator, education becomes reduced to a pressure from without. It may, indeed, give certain external results, but cannot truly be called educative. Without insight into the psychological structure and activities of the individual, the educative process will, therefore, be haphazard and arbitrary. If it chances to coincide with the child's activity it will get a leverage; if it does not, it will result in friction, or disintegration, or arrest of the child nature.

I believe that knowledge of social conditions, of the present state of civilization, is necessary to properly interpret the child's powers. The child has his own instincts and tendencies, but we do not know what these mean until we can translate them into their social equivalents. We must be able to carry them back into a social past and see them as the inheritance of previous race activities. We must also be able to project them into the future to see what their outcome and end will be. In the illustration just used, it is the ability to see in the child's babblings the promise and potency of a future social intercourse and conversation which enables one to deal in the proper way with that instinct.

I believe that the psychological and social sides are organically related, and that education cannot be regarded as a compromise between the two, or a superimposition of one



upon the other. We are told that the psychological definition of education is barren and formal—that it gives us only the idea of a development of all the mental powers without giving us any idea of the use to which these powers are put. On the other hand, it is urged that the social definition of education, as getting adjusted to civilization, makes of it a forced and external process, and results in subordinating the freedom of the individual to a preconceived social and political status.

I believe each of these objections is true when urged against one side isolated from the other. In order to know what a power really is we must know what its end, use, or function is; and this we cannot know save as we conceive of the individual as active in social relationships. But, on the other hand, the only possible adjustment which we can give to the child under existing conditions, is that which arises through putting him in complete possession of all his powers. With the advent of democracy and modern industrial conditions, it is impossible to foretell definitely just what civilization will be twenty years from now. Hence it is impossible to prepare the child for any precise set of conditions. To prepare him for the future life means to give him command of himself; it means so to train him that he will have the full and ready use of all his capacities; that his eye and ear and hand may be tools ready to command, that his judgment may be capable of grasping the conditions under which it has to work, and the executive forces be trained to act economically and efficiently. It is impossible to reach this sort of adjustment save as constant regard is had to the individual's own powers, tastes, and interests—say, that is as education is continually converted into psychological terms.

In sum, I believe that the individual who is to be educated is a social individual, and that society is an organic union of individuals. If we eliminate the social factor from

the child we are left only with an abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert and lifeless mass. Education, therefore, must begin with a psychological insight into the child's capacities, interests, and habits. It must be controlled at every point by reference to these same considerations. These powers, interests, and habits must be continually interpreted—we must know what they mean. They must be translated into terms of their social equivalents—into terms of what they are capable of in the way of social service.

## ARTICLE II. WHAT THE SCHOOL IS.

I believe that the school is primarily a social institution. Education being a social process, the school is simply that form of community life in which all those agencies are concentrated that will be most effective in bringing the child to share in the inherited resources of the race, and to use his own powers for social ends.

I believe that education, therefore, is a process of living and not a preparation for future living.

I believe that the school must represent present life—life as real and vital to the child as that which he carries on in the home, in the neighborhood, or on the playground.

I believe that education which does not occur through forms of life, forms that are worth living for their own sake, is always a poor substitute for the genuine reality, and tends to cramp and to deaden.

I believe that the school, as an institution, should simplify existing social life; should reduce it, as it were, to an embryonic form. Existing life is so complex that the child cannot be brought into contact with it without either confusion or distraction; he is either overwhelmed by the multiplicity of activities which are going on, so that he loses his own power of orderly reaction, or he is so stimulated by these various activities that his powers are prematurely called

into play and he becomes either unduly specialized or else disintegrated.

I believe that, as such simplified social life, the school life should grow gradually out of the home life; that it should take up and continue the activities with which the child is already familiar in the home.

I believe that it should exhibit these activities to the child, and reproduce them in such ways that the child will gradually learn the meaning of them, and be capable of playing his own part in relation to them.

I believe that this is a psychological necessity, because it is the only way of securing continuity in the child's growth, the only way of giving a background of past experience to the new ideas given in school.

I believe it is also a social necessity because the home is the form of social life in which the child has been nurtured and in connection with which he has had his moral training. It is the business of the school to deepen and extend his sense of the values bound up in his home life.

I believe that much of present education fails because it neglects this fundamental principle of the school as a form of community life. It conceives the school as a place where certain information is to be given, where certain lessons are to be learned, or where certain habits are to be formed. The value of these is conceived as lying largely in the remote future; the child must do these things for the sake of something else he is to do; they are mere preparations. As a result they do not become a part of the life experience of the child and so are not truly educative.

I believe that the moral education centers upon this conception of the school as a mode of social life, that the best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity of work and thought. The present educational systems, so far as they destroy or neglect this unity, render it



difficult or impossible to get any genuine, regular moral training.

I believe that the child should be stimulated and controlled in his work through the life of the community.

I believe that under existing conditions far too much of the stimulus and control proceeds from the teacher, because of neglect of the idea of the school as a form of social life.

I believe that the teacher's place and work in the school is to be interpreted from this same basis. The teacher is not in the school to impose certain ideas or to form certain habits in the child, but is there as a member of the community to select the influences which shall affect the child and to assist him in properly responding to these influences.

I believe that the discipline of the school should proceed from the life of the school as a whole and not directly from the teacher.

I believe that the teacher's business is simply to determine, on the basis of larger experience and riper wisdom, how the discipline of life shall come to the child.

I believe that all questions of the grading of the child and his promotion should be determined by reference to the same standard. Examinations are of use only so far as they test the child's fitness for social life and reveal the place in which he can be of the most service and where he can receive the most help.

### ARTICLE III. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF EDUCATION.

I believe that the social life of the child is the basis of concentration, or correlation, in all his training or growth. The social life gives the unconscious unity and the background of all his efforts and of all his attainments.

I believe that the subject-matter of the school curriculum should mark a gradual differentiation out of the primitive unconscious unity of social life.

I believe that we violate the child's nature and render



difficult the best ethical results by introducing the child too abruptly to a number of special studies, of reading, writing, geography, etc., out of relation to this social life.

I believe, therefore, that the true center of correlation on the school subjects is not science, nor literature, nor history, nor geography, but the child's own social activities.

I believe that education cannot be unified in the study of science, or so-called nature study, because apart from human activity, nature itself is not a unity; nature in itself is a number of diverse objects in space and time, and to attempt to make it the center of work by itself is to introduce a principle of radiation rather than one of concentration.

I believe that literature is the reflex expression and interpretation of social experience; that hence it must follow upon and not preclude such experience. It, therefore, cannot be made the basis, although it may be made the summary of unification.

I believe once more that history is of educative value in so far as it presents phases of social life and growth. It must be controlled by reference to social life. When taken simply as history it is thrown into the distant past and becomes dead and inert. Taken as the record of man's social life and progress it becomes full of meaning. I believe, however, that it cannot be so taken excepting as the child is also introduced directly into social life.

I believe that the primary basis of education is in the child's powers at work along the same general constructive lines as those which have brought civilization into being.

I believe that the only way to make the child conscious of his social heritage is to enable him to perform those fundamental types of activity which make civilization what it is.

I believe, therefore, in the so-called expressive or constructive activities as the center of correlation.

I believe that this gives the standard for the place of cooking, sewing, manual training, etc., in the school.

I believe that they are not special studies which are to be introduced over and above a lot of others in the way of relaxation or relief, or as additional accomplishments. I believe rather that they represent, as types, fundamental forms of social activity; and that it is possible and desirable that the child's introduction into the more formal subjects of the curriculum be through the medium of these activities.

I believe that the study of science is educational in so far as it brings out the materials and processes which make social life what it is.

I believe that one of the greatest difficulties in the present teaching of science is that the material is presented in purely objective form, or is treated as a new peculiar kind of experience which the child can add to that which he has already had. In reality, science is of value because it gives the ability to interpret and control the experience already had. It should be introduced, not as so much new subject-matter, but as showing the factors already involved in previous experience and as furnishing tools by which that experience can be more easily and effectively regulated.

I believe that at present we lose much of the value of literature and language studies because of our elimination of the social element. Language is almost always treated in the books of pedagogy simply as the expression of thought. It is true that language is a logical instrument, but it is fundamentally and primarily a social instrument. Language is the device for communication; it is the tool through which one individual comes to share the ideas and feelings of others. When treated simply as a way of getting individual information, or as a means of showing off what one has learned, it loses its social motive and end.

I believe that there is, therefore, no succession of studies in the ideal school curriculum. If education is life, all life has, from the outset, a scientific aspect; an aspect of art

and culture and an aspect of communication. It cannot, therefore, be true that the proper studies for one grade are mere reading and writing, and that at a later grade, reading, or literature, or science, may be introduced. The progress is not in the succession of studies, but in the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.

I believe, finally, that education must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction of experience; that the process and the goal of education are one and the same thing.

I believe that to set up any end outside of education, as furnishing its goal and standard, is to deprive the educational process of much of its meaning, and tends to make us rely upon false and external stimuli in dealing with the child.

#### ARTICLE IV. THE NATURE OF METHOD.

I believe that the question of method is ultimately reducible to the question of the order of development of the child's powers and interests. The law for presenting and treating material is the law implicit within the child's own nature. Because this is so I believe the following statements are of supreme importance as determining the spirit in which education is carried on:

1. I believe that the active side precedes the passive in the development of the child-nature; that expression comes before conscious impression; that the muscular development precedes the sensory; that movements come before conscious sensations; I believe that consciousness is essentially motor or impulsive; that conscious states tend to project themselves in action.

I believe that the neglect of this principle is the cause of a large part of the waste of time and strength in school work. The child is thrown into a passive, receptive, or absorbing attitude. The conditions are such that he is not permitted to follow the law of his nature; the result is friction and waste.



I believe that ideas (intellectual and rational processes), also result from action and devolve for the sake of the better control of action. What we term reason is primarily the law of orderly or effective action. To attempt to develop the reasoning powers, the powers of judgment, without reference to the selection and arrangement of means in action, is the fundamental fallacy in our present methods of dealing with this matter. As a result we present the child with arbitrary symbols. Symbols are a necessity in mental development, but they have their place as tools for economizing effort; presented by themselves they are a mass of meaningless and arbitrary ideas imposed from without.

2. I believe that the image is the great instrument of instruction. What a child gets out of any subject presented to him is simply the images which he himself forms with regard to it.

I believe that if nine-tenths of the energy at present directed towards making the child learn certain things were spent in seeing to it that the child was forming proper images, the work of instruction would be indefinitely facilitated.

I believe that much of the time and attention now given to the preparation and presentation of lessons might be more wisely and profitably expended in training the child's power of imagery and in seeing to it that he was continually forming definite, vivid, and growing images of the various subjects with which he comes in contact in his experience.

3. I believe that interests are the signs of growing power. I believe that they represent dawning capacities. Accordingly the constant and careful observation of interests is of the utmost importance for the educator.

I believe that these interests are to be observed as showing the state of development which the child has reached.

I believe that they prophesy the stage upon which he is about to enter.



I believe that only through the continual and sympathetic observation of childhood's interests can the adult enter into the child's life and see what it is ready for, and upon what material it could work most readily and fruitfully.

I believe that these interests are neither to be humored nor repressed. To repress interest is to substitute the adult for the child, and so to weaken intellectual curiosity and alertness, to suppress initiative, and to deaden interest. To humor the interests is to substitute the transient for the permanent. The interest is always a sign of some power below; the important thing is to discover this power. To humor the interest is to fail to penetrate below the surface, and its sure result is to substitute caprice and whim for genuine interest.

4. I believe that the emotions are the reflex of actions.

I believe that to endeavor to stimulate or arouse the emotions apart from their corresponding activities is to introduce an unhealthy and morbid state of mind.

I believe that if we can only secure right habits of action and thought, with reference to the good, the true, and the beautiful, the emotions will for the most part take care of themselves.

I believe that next to deadness and dullness, formalism and routine, our education is threatened with no greater evil than sentimentalism.

I believe that this sentimentalism is the necessary result of the attempt to divorce feeling from action.

#### ARTICLE V. THE SCHOOL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

I believe that education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform.

I believe that all reforms which rest simply upon the enactment of law, or the threatening of certain penalties, or upon changes in mechanical or outward arrangements, are transitory and futile.

I believe that education is a regulation of the process of coming to share in the social consciousness; and that the adjustment of individual activity on the basis of this social consciousness is the only sure method of social reconstruction.

I believe that this conception has due regard for both the individualistic and socialistic ideals. It is duly individual because it recognizes the formation of a certain character as the only genuine basis of right living. It is socialistic because it recognizes that this right character is not to be formed by merely individual precept, example, or exhortation, but rather by the influence of a certain form of institutional or community life upon the individual, and that the social organism through the school, as its organ, may determine ethical results.

I believe that in the ideal school we have the reconciliation of the individualistic and the institutional ideals.

I believe that the community's duty to education is, therefore, its paramount moral duty. By law and punishment, by social agitation and discussion, society can regulate and form itself in a more or less haphazard and chance way. But through education society can formulate its own purposes, can organize its own means and resources, and thus shape itself with definiteness and economy in the direction in which it wishes to move.

I believe that when society once recognizes the possibilities in this direction, and the obligations which these possibilities impose, it is impossible to conceive of the resources of time, attention, and money which will be put at the disposal of the educator.

I believe it is the business of every one interested in education to insist upon the school as the primary and most effective interest of social progress and reform in order that society may be awakened to realize what the school stands for, and aroused to the necessity of endowing the educator with sufficient equipment properly to perform his task.

I believe that education thus conceived marks the most perfect and intimate union of science and art conceivable in human experience.

I believe that the art of thus giving shape to human powers and adapting them to social service is the supreme art; one calling into its service the best of artists; that no insight, tact, executive power is too great for such service.

I believe that with the growth of psychological service, giving added insight into individual structure and laws of growth; and with growth of social science, adding to our knowledge of the right organization of individuals, all scientific resources can be utilized for purposes of education.

I believe that when science and art thus join hands the most commanding motive for human action will be reached; the most genuine springs of human conduct aroused, and the best service that human nature is capable of guaranteed.

I believe, finally, that the teacher is engaged, not simply in the training of individuals, but in the formation of the proper social life.

I believe that every teacher should realize the dignity of his calling; that he is a social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the right social growth.

I believe that in this way the teacher always is the prophet of the true God and the usherer in of the true kingdom of God.



# DEMANDS OF SOCIOLOGY UPON PEDAGOGY.

By Professor ALBION W. SMALL, Ph. D.,  
University of Chicago.

AT the risk of seeming to reopen a closed incident of ancient history, this paper will take its departure from some passages in the report of the Committee of Ten. The present aim is to define a point of view quite different from that of the committee. In emphasizing the ends to be gained in education, rather than the means to be employed, the writer wishes to be understood as having in mind the whole school career. It is impossible within the limits of this paper to discuss laws or principles of variation which from this point of view should adapt methods to the learner's needs at different stages of mental growth.

"The principal end of all education," says the Conference on History, Civil Government, and Political Economy, "is training" (p. 168).

The sociologist develops this noncommittal response of the oracle into the following: The end of all education is, first, completion of the individual; second, implied in the first, adaptation of the individual to such co-operation with the society in which his lot is cast that he works at his best with the society in perfecting its own type, and consequently in creating conditions favorable to the development of a more perfect type of individual.

The Committee of Ten seems to have stopped at conclusions which tacitly assume that psychical processes in the individual are ends unto themselves. To be sure, there are signs of a vague looking for of judgment from the tribunal of larger life upon the products of this pedagogy; but the standards of a real test seem to have had little effect



upon the committee's point of view. We are told (p. 168) that the mind is chiefly developed in three ways: (a) by cultivating the powers of discriminating observation; (b) by strengthening the logical faculty . . .; (c) by improving the processes of comparison, *i. e.*, the judgment. We are further told that "studies in language and the natural sciences are best adapted to cultivate the habits of observation; mathematics, for the training of the reasoning faculties; history and allied branches, to promote the mental power which we call the judgment." The naively mediæval psychology behind all this would be humorous if it were not tragical. I need not label the pedagogic philosophy with which my sociology allies itself when I declare that sociology, in common with the most intelligent pedagogy of to-day, refuses to classify educational material along these lines. In the first place, education is not an affair of perception, reflection, and judgment alone. Education connotes the evolution of the whole personality, not merely of intelligence. In the second place, if I am not mistaken, a consensus is rapidly forming, both in pedagogy and in sociology, to the effect that action in contact with reality, not artificial selection of abstracted phases of reality, is the normal condition of maximum rate and symmetrical form of personal development. Sociology consequently joins with pedagogy in the aim to bring persons, whether in school or out of school, into as direct contact as possible with the concrete conditions in which all the functions of personality must be applied and controlled. In these conditions alone is that balanced action possible which is the desideratum alike of pedagogical and of social culture.

Once more the Committee of Ten was content to remain in the dismal shadows of the immemorial misconception that *disjecta membra* of representative knowledge are the sole available resource for educational development. I do not find among the fundamental concepts of the report any dis-

tinct recognition of the coherence of the things with which intelligent pedagogy aims to procure personal adaptation. The report presents a classified catalogue of subjects good for study, but there is no apparent conception of the cosmos of which these subjects are abstracted phases and elements. Nowhere in the report do I find recognition that education, when it is finished, is conscious conformity of individuals to the coherent cosmic reality of which they are parts. Until our pedagogy rests upon a more intelligent cosmic philosophy, and especially upon a more complete synthesis of social philosophy, we can hardly expect curricula to correspond with the essential conditions to which human action must learn to conform. A graduate of a leading Eastern university, who is now making an impression upon American pedagogy, said recently that when he took his diploma, about ten years ago, history to his mind was a collection of material which he had studied under Professor A.; political economy, another independent body of information which he studied under Professor B.; psychology, another isolated subject which he had studied under Professor C.; and so on through the curriculum. Not until six or seven years after graduation did it dawn upon him that each of these details of representation is an aspect of one reality which the pedagogy of the college had concealed in making the fragments prominent. The most serious consideration about this pedagogical perversion is not that it limits knowledge alone. It distorts the whole attitude of men towards the world. Instead of introducing men to reality it tricks them into belief that an unorganized procession of pedantic abstractions is reality.

The report of the Committee of Ten presents to the sociologist, therefore, this anomaly: It is a whole made up of parts, every one of which may possibly be accepted by sociology; but the totality, as presented by the committee, sociology must peremptorily reject. It is hot on the trail

of pedagogical and sociological truth, without actually coming within sight of the truth. Human personality is not doomed to struggle forever *seriatim* with a long list of detached groups of facts in order to get its psychic and social development. The world of experience is one, not many. Pedagogy and sociology are discovering this unity by different processes, and as a consequence of their perception that educational material is essentially one, not many, pedagogy and sociology are bound to combine their demands for a complete change of front in education. The proper educator is reality, not conventionalized abstractions from reality. Hence the demand of the new pedagogy, supported heartily by the new sociology, that schooling, particularly in its earlier stages, shall be changed from an afflictive imposition upon life to a rationally concentrated accomplishment of a portion of life itself. Hence the correlated demand of the new pedagogy, also seconded by the new sociology, that, so far as conscious effort is made by instructors to supplement the education of action by the education of cognition, the objects of contemplation shall be kept real by being viewed constantly as organic parts of the one reality. They must no longer be made unreal through analytic segregation which leaves them standing apart as independent realities.

Having thus by negation challenged some of the implicit concessions of the Committee of Ten to the old dogmatic pedagogy, and to presociological concepts of reality, I pass to a positive definition of the outlook of sociology. I believe it to be also in the line of the pedagogy that will prevail.

Human experience is concerned with three knowable elements: First, man's material environment, inanimate and animate; second, man himself as an individual, in all his characteristics, from his place in the animal kingdom, through his special physiology, psychology, and technology; third, man's associations or institutions. Sociology is the



systematic attempt to reduce the reactions of these three elements—nature, man, institutions—to scientific form and expression. The inclusive reality which sociology finds comprehending both the processes and the products of these reactions is society, *i. e.*, individuals in association, within the conditions imposed by the material environment and modified by human achievement. The task set for each individual when he finds himself participant of this reality is to accommodate himself to prevailing conditions in such a manner that he may both accomplish and enjoy a maximum share of the development which his stage in social evolution is empowered to accomplish.

This life task of men consequently sets the pedagogical task of teachers. The prime problem of education, as the sociologist views it, is how to promote adaptation of the individual to the conditions, natural and artificial, within which individuals live and move and have their being. It would not be in point to discuss here the relative place of action and cognition in progress toward this end. That belongs to pedagogical technology. I assume that both action and cognition are unchallenged means of modern pedagogy. With their proportions, and with the appropriate sequence at different stages of culture, sociology is not directly concerned. Sociology has no tolerance, however, for the pedantry that persists in carpentering together educational courses out of subjects which are supposed to exercise, first, the perceptive faculty, then the memory, then the language faculty, then the logical faculty, etc., etc., etc. On the contrary, every represented contact of a person with a portion of reality sooner or later calls into exercise every mental power of that person, probably in a more rational order and proportion than can be produced by an artificial process. Our business as teachers is primarily, therefore, not to train particular mental powers, but to select points of contact between learning minds and the reality that is to be learned.



The mind's own autonomy will look out for the appropriate series of subjective mental processes. In the second place, our business as teachers is to bring these perceptive contacts of pupils' minds with points of objective reality into true association with all the remainder of objective reality, *i. e.*, we should help pupils, first, to see things, and second, to see things together as they actually exist in reality. In other words, the demand of sociology upon pedagogy is that it shall stop wet-nursing orphan mental faculties, and find out how to bring persons into touch with what objectively is, as it is. The mind itself will do the rest.

In pursuance of this demand, sociology necessarily becomes an active partisan upon one of the pedagogical doctrines over which educators are divided, *viz.*: sociology denies that the rational center for the concentration of studies is any science or group of sciences. The rational center is the student himself. Personal adaptation to life means the given person's organization of his contacts with reality. In other words, pedagogy should be the science of assisting youth to organize their contacts with reality; and by this I mean to organize these contacts with reality by both thought and action, and for both thought and action.

Relatively the world stands still during the school-age of any person. The pupil himself changes visibly almost every day. The reality with which the pupil can have conscious contact is defined therefore by the pupil's own powers and opportunities. At each stage, however, himself on the one hand, and nature, men, institutions, on the other hand, are the subject and object of adjustment. A changing self has the task of adaptation to a surrounding frame of things, which daily displays new mysteries and complexities. The teacher's task is to help the individual understand this environment, of which the pupil for a long time seems to himself to be the center. It is the teacher's business to help the pupil understand this whole environment as it is related to

himself. Presently, if the pupil's perceptions grow more penetrating and comprehensive, his own personal interests cease to seem the pivot on which the world of experience turns. His personality becomes extended, and at the same time his egoism gets balanced with the personal equation of others whose interests appear. The child finds the complement of his egoism in the family, the school, the group of playmates, the community, and at last, if his education is complete, in society at large. Yet, at each varying diameter of comprehension, life, of which the child is at first to himself the center and circumference, and later life as a whole, of which to the last the individual is to himself in the final resort the most interesting part—life, either individual or social, is the ever-present reality which summarizes all that men can positively know. This central and inclusive reality varies, in re-presentation, from socially unrelated individual life to a conception of individual life enlarged by evolved social consciousness into a function of the more abiding reality. This human career, either as pursued for himself by the socially unconscious individual, or as a mingling of the individual with others associated by force of circumstances in pursuing purposes which none perfectly comprehend,—this life of men alike in nature, within conditions imposing common limitations upon nature,—is the whole of man's range of positive experience and scientific observation. Sociology consequently demands of educators that they shall elaborate available aids, first, to perception by the individual of the relation of part to part in this inclusive reality—the life of men in society; second, that educators shall perfect influences to promote adjustment of individuals to their appropriate functions within this whole. The part of the problem which I have at present in mind is the proper direction and organization of the pupil's perceptions. So far as the subject-matter of sociology is concerned, everything knowable and worth knowing is a fact or a relation

helping to make up this complexity which we call society or social life. The important claim of sociology in this connection is that this reality, like poverty, we have always with us. This reality as a connected whole, related to the pupil, is always the natural and rational means of education. A sequence of studies, in the sense that the pupil is to be enjoined from intelligent contact with portions of reality until other portions have had their turn, is a monstrous perversion of the conditions of education. All reality, the whole plexus of social life, is continually confronting the pupil. No "subject" abstracted from this actual whole is veracious to the pupil unless he is permitted to see it as a part of the whole. It is a misconstruction of reality to think and accordingly to act as though one kind of knowledge belongs to one age and another to another. The whole vast mystery of life, in all its processes and conditions, confronts the child as really as it does the sage. It is the business of the educator to help the child interpret the part by the whole. Education from the beginning should be an initiation into science, language, philosophy, art, and political action in the largest sense. When we shall have adopted a thoroughly rational pedagogy, the child will begin to learn everything the moment he begins to learn anything.

Am I demanding a pedagogy which presupposes one philosopher as teacher and another as pupil? Certainly. Every teacher ought to be a philosopher. Every child already is one till conventionality spoils him. More than that, he is also a scientist; poet, and artist in embryo, and would mature in all these characters if we did not stunt him with our bungling. I would revive Rousseau's cry, "Return to nature!" but in a sense which Rousseau never dreamed,—not nature in the burlesque of our ignorant preconceptions, but nature scientifically explored, nature, the universal law of which is to own the sway of rational mind.

I am not asserting that grammar, and geometry, and



geography, and geology, and history, and economics, and psychology, and ethics, as such, should be taught in the nursery. I am asserting that in the cradle the child begins to be in contact with that nature and society of which all these are phases and products, and reports. Sociology demands for the child, from the cradle to his second childhood, opportunities for such frank contact with life that its various aspects will confide to him their mystery in its real relations with the other elements of life. Sociology demands of the tutors and governors who lead the child through the formal part of education, that they shall pilot Wilhelm Meister so discretely through his years of apprenticeship that he shall learn his world at the smallest expense and with least cause for regret both to others and to himself. Whether this citizen of the world shall ever learn to construe life in terms of the conventional sciences is an entirely secondary matter. The main thing is that, from the beginning, he shall learn to know himself and his world truly—so far as he knows at all,—in all essential relations. This involves the learning of such sciences as he does acquire in the character of excerpts from the whole book of knowledge, not as self-sufficient knowledges.

I repeat that sociology values subjects of study for reasons quite different from those traditionally alleged. Physical, biological, and social science, with the products of human thought deposited in literature, are worthy of study not because they are tonics for various kinds of mental impotence, but because they are, and only in so far as they are, revealers of man himself and of the life of which he is both creator and creature.

Without alluding further to other departments of knowledge, I may apply what I have said to the subject-matter of the social sciences in particular.

Sociology demands with equal confidence: first, that for everybody the study of *society* shall begin with the nursing-



bottle, and continue so long as social relations continue; second, that for most people the study of *sociology* shall never begin at all. If the argument thus far has provoked expectation that I shall recommend the introduction of sociology into the curriculum of the lower schools, as the needed corrective of educational defects, the inference is decidedly at fault. Only exceptional pupils should study sociology earlier than their senior year in college, and probably these few would do better to defer the study till after taking the bachelor's degree. While sociology proper is not a desirable subject for young pupils, our educational methods will be miserably inadequate to their social function till every teacher, from the kindergarten on, is sufficiently instructed in sociology to put all his teaching in the setting which the sociological view-point affords. This implies, of course, that the function of education must one day be taken so seriously that only men and women who have more than the bachelor's preparation will be intrusted with its direction.

The study of society which we may reasonably demand in our schools and colleges to-day must and should be chiefly in connection with the subjects physiography, political geography, anthropology, ethnology, history, civics, and economics. The sociological demand with reference to these subjects is that instruction in them shall be rationalized in the same way that the teaching of geography has been reformed during my recollection. I was not the boy who spent his first week in algebra trying to find out the value of  $x$ , but my most lasting recollections of the study of geography cluster around some cabalistic representations of the plane of the ecliptic.

To this day I am not perfectly clear about the meaning of those ghostly figures which lent weird interest to the earlier pages of the book. They produced in my youthful mind vague conceptions of uncanny gyrations among celestial bodies, presumed by the author to be the proper medium

for introducing youth to a knowledge of the earth's surface. This is not intelligent correlation of whole and part. It is arbitrary creation of a whole to which the pupil's experience does not yet correspond. In another view it thrust upon the pupil's attention a part which he has not differentiated from the whole. I presume that every parent and every teacher who has liberty to use his own judgment now begins the teaching of geography with that spot of *terra firma* which is next to the home or the schoolhouse. Whether the plane of the ecliptic ever gets mentioned is a matter of very slight concern. A similar change in the social sciences is well in progress, but it is not yet a prevalent policy. At my graduation from college I passed a respectable examination on the constitution and by-laws of the government at Westminster, but I knew practically nothing, and was never told that it was worth while to know anything, about the government of the town in which the college was located. My knowledge of the British constitution has never yet found any practical application, but for a decade, as citizen and petty officeholder in that college community, I was obliged to study and use the town charter and ordinances, which were not worth the notice of my former instructors. Sociology, like charity, ought to begin at home; but, like charity, it ought not to stay at home. The rational method of observation, recognizing the real concentration of life around each member of society, explores the concentric circles of social activity from the actual standpoint of the observer. The child should begin to study economics literally,—the law of the household,—he should learn the civics and ethics and history of the household, in the practice of normal household relations. The economy of politics and ethics and history of the school, and then of the parent's shop, and then of the neighboring factory, and later of the whole town, are the best educational material that the sociologist can recommend. In other words, the social *desideratum* is that the developing member of so-

ciety shall become analytically and synthetically intelligent about the society to which he belongs. The precision of his social intelligence in general depends upon the exactness of his knowledge of details in the life which he most intimately shares.\*

Observation of the structure, functions, and forces of life in one's own community is the normal beginning of true and large social intelligence and action. Even history should begin with the present, not with the past. Just as Gibbon interpreted the tactics of the Roman legions by the knowledge he gained in the British militia, so every student of history is prepared to reconstruct the past only as he possesses correct and adequate conceptions of the present. Sociological analysis of the anatomy, physiology, and psychology of society furnishes the alphabet to spell out the lessons of history.

The only change in school methods which I am urging is the introduction of this laboratory study of the social facts, processes, and forces nearest at hand, as exhibiting typical social relations in all nations, times, and places. This is not as a substitute for the present subjects in the social sciences, but as a method of approaching present subjects.

One more demand is urged by sociology upon pedagogy, viz., that all direct or indirect observations of society shall be organized under at least three great categories; first,

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\*Small and Vincent's 'Introduction to the Study of Society' is the first attempt to furnish a laboratory guide for this sort of study. It is not a text-book in sociology, but a pathmaker in methods of observing and arranging societary facts. Variations of the method are possible to fit different needs, from the kindergarten to the seminary. The University of Chicago Press has just issued a typical study of the City of Galesburg, upon this plan, an adaptation of the method of Schæffle, by Mr. A. W. Dunn. Such work can neither displace nor be displaced by another kind of work upon societary material, as represented, for example, by two recent text-books on sociology, Giddings' 'Principles of Sociology,' and Fairbanks' 'Introduction to Sociology.'



interdependence; second, order or co-operation; third, progress or continuity.\* Unless social information can be construed in at least these three forms nothing can save it from frivolity and barrenness. The categories are not logically exclusive,—the fault of the things themselves.

By the first category, interdependence, I mean the universal fact that every act or event in human life has been made possible or necessary by other acts or events connected with other lives both past and present, and that it helps to make or mar the lives of others. Beginning with the family, and extending to the compass of the race, society is a network of interdependences. One of the discoveries which pupils should be aided to make, in their study of any time or nation or human process, should be that the particular men concerned exemplified the truth "No man liveth unto himself."

By the second category, order or co-operation, I mean the machine-like interplay of actors and actions in every minute social group as well as in large societies. The relation is so clear that Mother Goose reported it genially, yet it is so obscure that society is daily dissipating its resources because the relation is not understood. From the factory whistle that rouses the workmen at five o'clock to the curfew bell at the close of day, the waking and the working and the resting of a town tell the truth of human welfare resting upon some form of established order. Wherever men have been associated even in the most temporary society, the measure of stability in their relations has been preserved by an institutional order, as real while it lasted as though it were defined by the iron decrees of Medes and Persians. A mode of temporary equilibrium is one of the forms in which

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\*I hope it is superfluous to add that the use of these terms or of any verbal substitutes, is not what I am contending for but the arrangement of ideas in conceptual form for which philosophers may find above designations convenient.



human association must be thought, if thought truly, whether in the society of Ivan the Terrible or of Grover the Inscrutable. When the learners read of any epoch of the past, one of the forms in which they must be helped to represent it, if it is to reveal truth to them, must be the reconstructed balance of influence and action in which the lives of that past time preserved their motion.

The biographical method of teaching history frequently violates this canon. Instead of being made to appear as one of the workers among whom the labor of their generation is divided, the great man in whom the story of his age is told seems to fill a sphere apart from ordinary men, affecting their destinies by some undetermined process of long-distance induction.

By the third category, progress or continuity, I mean the conception of men and events as always working out new individual conditions and social arrangements, the truth, on the one hand, that "the roots of the present are deep in the past," on the other hand, that the present cannot escape responsibility for the future. When historical acts are recalled they should always be considered at last in this third aspect. What motives and impulses led to them? What consequences and effects did they set in motion? This is the scientific attitude of mind toward the past. It is the genuinely social attitude toward the present and the future. It is the purely intellectual condition of the co-operative constructive temper which is the last and best product to be demanded of education. Yet I have known courses in history to be conducted under the highest institutional sanction, with no discernible reference to historical cause and consequence. Search and emphasis were entirely for the facts. Specialization of that sort is falsification. Facts cannot be told truly except in their relations.

Sociology demands of educators, finally, that they shall not rate themselves as leaders of children, but as makers of

society. Sociology knows no means for the amelioration or reform of society more radical than those of which teachers hold the leverage. The teacher who realizes his social function will not be satisfied with passing children to the next grade. He will read his success only in the record of men and women who go from the school eager to explore wider and deeper these social relations, and zealous to do their part in making a better future. We are the dupes of faulty analysis if we imagine that schools can do much to promote social progress until they are motivated by this insight and this temper.

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
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