

Foundations, United States Foreign Policy, and African Education, 1945-1975

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In this essay Edward Berman explores the way in which the relationship between United States foreign policy and the major American foundations has helped to shape African educational policy since 1945. Berman contends that the foundations, in particular Ford, Rockefeller, and the Carnegie Corporation, have directed their support at areas of political or economic importance to American corporate interests—to the possible detriment of the needs of the developing nations themselves.

In examining the rationale for foundation support of various educational programs and the ways in which foundation policy has been implemented in Africa, Berman finds support for his view that American philanthropy was at least partially motivated by the need to promote a sympathetic view of American political and corporate activity—an activity which was necessary to ensure both continuing access to African mineral resources and the continued cultural dependence of the newly independent nations on the western bloc. Professor Berman concludes by warning that the current Chinese, Soviet, and Cuban activities in Africa augur no clearer movement towards the creation of African-controlled models of development than previous activities sponsored by the foundations.

Recent events in Angola, the Ethiopia-Eritrea-Somalia triangle, Zaire, and Rhodesia have brought to the attention of the American public areas of the African continent that were formerly unfamiliar except to a handful of academics, mis-

Funds to support the research upon which this article is based came from the Research Committee of the University of Louisville School of Education. The Committee is naturally absolved from any responsibility for my opinions. I should also like to acknowledge the support provided by personnel at the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations in making available archival materials for this study. A somewhat different version of this paper will appear in *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*, ed. Robert F. Arnove (Boston: G. K. Hall, forthcoming).

Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, May 1979.

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0017 8055/79/0500-0145\$02.70/0

sionaries, businessmen, government officials, and foundation representatives. Increasing levels of Cuban, Chinese, and Soviet interest and intervention in various African states ensure that the United States government's concern for these areas will increase. Although there have been some Washington policy makers who have argued that the United States should not overreact to the communist presence in Africa, the direction of United States' foreign policy since 1945—characterized by strident anticommunism and the quest for stable national polities receptive to United States' corporate investment—suggests that such counsel will fall on deaf ears.

By 1945, it was obvious to all but the most recalcitrant colonialist that it was only a matter of time before the British, French, and Dutch colonial empires were dismantled. At the same time, ascendancy of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, signaled the beginning of a scramble to align the colonial territories with one of the emerging power blocs. However, the American position on colonial dependencies, as elaborated in Roosevelt's interpretation of the Atlantic Charter, required official support for the increasingly vocal Asian and African nationalist demands for independence.¹ Since overt colonialism was no longer acceptable to world opinion, the United States needed surrogate organizations to protect and further her interests in the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

It is the thesis of this article that the major United States foundations—Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller—have played important roles in furthering American foreign policy objectives in Africa, Asia, and Latin America since 1945. Focusing on Africa, I will document how the foundations devised strategies and funded programs to bind the newly independent African nations to the United States. The foundations accomplished this primarily by funding programs linking the educational systems of the new African nations to the values, *modus operandi*, and institutions of the United States. In public pronouncements, foundation officials have stressed the nonpolitical, technocratic nature of their involvement in African education, noting that the foundations' interests lay solely in the provision of educational models and institutional support designed to help the developing African nations modernize and thereby provide more benefits for their peoples.² Internal foundation policy documents and correspondence, inter-foundation memoranda, and personal reminiscences of foundation personnel suggest that this public rhetoric of disinterested humanitarianism was little more than a facade behind which the economic and strategic interests of the United States have been actively furthered.

In view of the evidence linking the foundations to the advancement of American foreign-policy objectives, particularly with respect to the vested economic interests of the United States corporate and financial sectors, the recent comments by Henry Ford II upon his resignation as a Ford Foundation trustee take on an ironic

¹ A discussion of the evolution of this position can be found in William Roger Lewis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978).

² See, for example, the comments of the Deputy Vice President of the Ford Foundation's International Division, Francis X. Sutton, in his "American Foundations and U. S. Public Diplomacy," an address delivered before the Symposium on the Future of U. S. Public Diplomacy, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 22, 1968.

significance. After noting what he felt to be the lack of direction of the Ford Foundation, Mr. Ford complained that current foundation policies neglected the fact that the foundation was "a creature of capitalism."³ At the heart of this lament was his charge that the Ford Foundation was supporting programs and institutions which, at best, were neutral toward capitalism and, at worst, actively dedicated to its demise. On the contrary, foundation activities in Africa have sought to sustain the system of corporate capitalism that Mr. Ford argues foundation policies are neglecting, and even undermining. Mr. Ford's concern that the foundation bearing his name strengthen and extend the American system of corporate capitalism is shared by his former fellow trustees and by Ford Foundation officers, as well as by trustees and officers of the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations.

The foundations have not lacked African collaborators to further these objectives. It is unlikely that the foundations could have implemented their programs had there not been Africans whose own interests and perspectives on development were identical to or at least consonant with those of the foundations. Indeed, an important aspect of the success of the foundations' work in Africa has been close collaboration between foundation staff on the one hand and African educational elites on the other.

The foundations' decision to work with and through indigenous elites gave substance to the belief that, as expressed by a Ford Foundation vice-president, the key to the successful developmental effort required that the foundations play "an important role in linking the modernizing elites of the world."⁴ The relative neglect in this paper of the crucial role played by the African elite in the furtherance of foundation objectives results more from the limitations of space than from the failure to appreciate its influence. This African group has served as the bridge between traditional society and the institutionalization of a capitalist system that benefits a small indigenous class and overseas interests.⁵ The programs of the major foundations have enhanced the positions of the educational elites in developing nations; indeed, at times such programs have even been responsible for the creation of an elite. Richard Fagen notes that these groups have "from the outset been spokesmen for . . . national and international class interests quite satisfied with the existing world economic system if not with their share of the pie."⁶ By representing these class interests, the elites have played pivotal roles in the expansion of the international capitalist system, thereby facilitating the accomplishment of a major foundation objective.

Before turning to a detailed examination of foundation-sponsored educational programs in several African countries, I will delineate a framework within which to examine this involvement.

³ Excerpts from Mr. Ford's valedictory address as a Foundation trustee are reprinted in the January 14, 1977 edition of *The Wall Street Journal*, together with a sympathetic editorial comment.

⁴ Francis X. Sutton, "American Foundations and U. S. Public Diplomacy," p. 9.

⁵ The way in which this elite performs this bridging function, while enriching itself through the process, is vividly and depressingly portrayed in Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-1971* (London: Heinemann, 1975).

⁶ Richard R. Fagen, "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Market: Thoughts on Extending Dependency Ideas," *International Organization*, 32 (1978), 295.

The Sociopolitical and Economic Determinants of Foundation Activities Abroad

For more than thirty years, the trustees and officers of the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford and Rockefeller foundations have shared with Washington policy makers and corporate and financial leaders the belief that the future of the American economic and political system required a strong American presence in the nations of the developing world. This common viewpoint linking the foundations to the American political and business structure is explained by the fact that foundation officers and trustees often double for, or have previously served as, Washington policy makers or business leaders. Domhoff notes how members of foundation boards regularly appear as members of prestigious and influential nongovernmental organizations, such as the Committee for Economic Development and the Council on Foreign Relations, and often hold cabinet and subcabinet positions in Republican and Democratic administrations in Washington.⁷ Horowitz indicates that these same individuals also serve as directors of some of the most powerful corporations in America.⁸ Several examples will illustrate the ties linking key foundation personnel to the American political, corporate, and financial elite.

John J. McCloy, who at various stages of his career served as Assistant Secretary of War, chairman of the board of the Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank, High Commissioner to Germany in the postwar period, chairman of the board of trustees of the Ford Foundation, trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, and president of the World Bank, is an archetypal member of this establishment. Robert S. McNamara's career parallels McCloy's: he has served as president of the Ford Motor Company and of the World Bank, as Secretary of Defense, and as a trustee of the Ford Foundation. Stephen Bechtel, president of one of the world's largest corporations, also serves as director of several major corporations and as a trustee of the Ford Foundation and of Stanford University, the latter having received considerable financial support from the former. Indeed, so intertwined are the corporate and financial leaders with the activities of the major foundations that Waldemar Nielsen, a former Ford Foundation executive and Marshall Plan administrator, cites as "incontestable fact" that "the boards of the big foundations are controlled by members of the American business elite."⁹

The major foundations are creatures of nineteenth- and twentieth-century capitalist accumulation and by the mid-twentieth century they were seeking to perpetuate that form of corporate capitalism that brought them into existence. Existing evidence strongly suggests that the multiply-affiliated foundation officials who have established foundation policy since 1945 subscribed to the belief that important ingredients for United States prosperity include overseas economic expansion, continued access to sources of raw materials abroad, and control of markets for American exports.¹⁰ These

⁷ G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 123-124. For details on the relationship between the Committee for Economic Development and American foreign policy, see David W. Eakins, "Business Planners and America's Postwar Expansion" in *Corporations and the Cold War*, ed. David Horowitz (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

⁸ David Horowitz, "The Foundations: Charity Begins at Home," *Ramparts*, April 1969, pp. 38-48.

⁹ Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Big Foundations* (New York and London: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972), p. 407.

¹⁰ Lloyd G. Gardner, "The New Deal, New Frontiers, and the Cold War: A Reassessment of American

themes mark the prologue to the African programs of the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford and Rockefeller foundations since 1945.

The strong links between the United States business elite and the boards of the major foundations ensure, minimally, that the foundations will not pursue policies inimical to the best interests of the business community. At the other extreme, it is arguable that the foundations would favor policies which actively promote these interests. In fact, data on the activities of the three major foundations support the contention that they pursue policies both at home and abroad which further the interests of both the United States business community and the government.

Repeated references by foundation spokesmen during the 1950s to the economic importance of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, suggest the economic determinants of foundation programs and the influence of the United States business community, as well as of the United States government which in turn is greatly influenced by corporate opinion, in the structuring of the foundations' overseas work. Alan Pifer, who had worked for the State Department before joining the Carnegie Corporation in 1953, noted in a paper prepared for a 1957 Corporation-sponsored conference that the primary reason for America's awakening interest in Africa was "the growing need for Africa's mineral and other natural resources."¹¹ In the same vein, Paul Hoffman, the first president of the Ford Foundation, former president of Studebaker Corporation and of the Committee for Economic Development, director of the Marshall Plan and of the first American aid agency, remarked that "our own dynamic economy has made us dependent on the outside world for many critical raw materials."¹² Any actions threatening industrial access to the sources of raw materials vital to the continued expansion of the United States economy, Hoffman continued, were viewed as detrimental. Philip E. Mosely — formerly a member of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations' influential War-Peace Studies project, which helped to shape the official United States view of the post-World War II world, and the State Department — made the same point as early as 1949 when he remarked that "the resources which the United States needs are not located in Europe, but are in the underdevel-

Expansion, 1933-1945," in *Corporations and the Cold War*, provides specifics on the corporate interest and influence in the direction of American foreign policy and the need for expanded markets. Additional documentation of corporate influence on U.S. foreign policy can be found in William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: World Publishing, 1959); and in Harry Magdoff's *The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of American Foreign Policy* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1969). An explication of this is provided in a recent government document, *United States Presidential Mission to the Western Hemisphere* (The Rockefeller Report), subtitled "Quality of Life in the Americas," (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969). In part the document notes that "just as the other American republics depend upon the United States for their capital equipment requirements, so the United States depends on them to provide a vast market for our manufactured goods. And as these countries look to the United States for a market for their primary products whose sale enables them to buy equipment for their development at home, so the United States looks to them for raw materials for our industries, on which depend the jobs of many of our citizens."

¹¹ Alan Pifer, background paper, May 14, 1957. Carnegie Corporation archives (hereafter CC): folder entitled Columbia University-American Assembly Conference on "The U.S. and Africa."

¹² Quoted in Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 50.

oped areas of the world. This is a significant reason why we can't concentrate all our efforts on Europe."¹³

Packenham's study of the political development ideas dominant in the United States since the second World War indicates that a consensus regarding the importance of economic and political stability in the underdeveloped world had begun to emerge among government officials and social scientists, many of whom were supported by the foundations by the mid-1950s, just at the time that the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations were embarking on their first significant African programs.¹⁴ Without belaboring the point, it is worth restating that it has been difficult to distinguish among Washington policy makers, corporate executives, and foundation officials, so frequently did these people exchange positions.¹⁵ The socioeconomic viewpoint of this decision-making group, according to Nielsen, "is essentially Lockean—with the protection of private property rights . . . as its central value."¹⁶ This viewpoint means that the establishment is staunchly anticommunist, since by definition, a socialist system of government would threaten the private property rights which form the core of this consensus.

The foreign policy manifestations of this devotion to the principle of private property rights led, after World War II, to "the policy of active intervention wherever required to defend the 'Free World' against Communist encroachment, Communist

¹³ Inter-office memorandum from Philip E. Mosely to Rockefeller Foundation staff, February 3, 1949, folder 900 Program and Policy, Underdeveloped Areas, Rockefeller Foundation archives, New York City. Papers pertaining to the activities of the Foundation are located in the Rockefeller Foundation Archive Center (hereafter RFAC) at Pocantico Hills, Tarrytown, New York, and at the Foundation offices at 1133 Avenue of the Americas, New York City (hereafter RFNYC). For details on the central role played by the Council on Foreign Relations, and through it by its foundation supporters, on the direction of American foreign policy in the post-World War II period see, for example, Laurence Shoup, "The Council on Foreign Relations and American Policy in Southeast Asia, 1940-1973," *The Insurgent Sociologist*, 7, No. 1 (1977), 19-30.

¹⁴ Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973).

¹⁵ Although several of these individuals have been mentioned above and more will be noted below it is instructive to list others. In the interests of space, this listing will be limited to Ford Foundation personnel. John Howard: nine years overseas aid work with the Lend Lease Administration, Office of Foreign Economic Assistance, Marshall Plan, Mutual Security Assistance Program, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and one-time head of Ford's international programs. Cleon Swayzee: Chief of Division of International Labor and Social Affairs in the U.S. Department of State and Director of Research of Ford's Board of Training and Research. Donald Price: Deputy Chairman of Research and Development, Department of Defense; Staff Director, Committee on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense; and Vice-President and Director of International Programs at Ford. Shepard Stone: Assistant to the High Commissioner of Germany; Director of International Programs at Ford, and President of the CIA- and Ford-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom, Paris. Wayne Fredericks: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Head of the Office of Middle East and Africa at Ford. This relationship is succinctly summed up by Ben Whitaker, *The Philanthropoids: Foundations and Society* (New York: William Morrow, 1974), p. 165, who notes that "the CIA-government-foundation worlds share so many of the same values and unconsciously act upon the same premises," that one cannot "corrupt" or "subvert" the other.

¹⁶ Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, p. 409. I refer to the contention of Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology* (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), p. 197, that "those who want to talk 'ideology' must also talk 'property.'"

subversion, and even native left-wing insurrections in the developing world."¹⁷ Miliband is even more explicit, arguing that the main thrust of United States foreign policy since 1945 has been to "prevent the coming into being, anywhere, of regimes fundamentally opposed to capitalist enterprise and determined to do away with it."¹⁸ In the recent Angolan civil war, the antipathy of the United States toward the Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the support for its Western oriented rivals, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union of the Liberation of Angola (UNITA), is illustrative of this trend in Africa.¹⁹

Men such as McCloy, Hoffman, and McNamara helped to elaborate and perpetuate the Cold War dogma that the benign United States attempts to make the world safe for democracy were constantly threatened by the imperialistic, Soviet-directed plot to establish world hegemony, after which the capitalist edifice would be dismantled and replaced by state socialism. Communism was equated with revolution and chaos, democracy with evolution and stability. The foreign policy establishment also recognized that communism was also bad for profits, a sentiment which remained *sotto voce*.²⁰

It would be chimerical at best to assume that the shared ideologies among these important individuals did not influence the policies of the foundations in whose affairs they played such central roles. The widely accepted Cold War mentality of the post-World War II period viewed a monolithic Communist threat directed against the economic and political hegemony of the United States-dominated world capitalist structure. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the foundations, whose boards of trustees and administrative ranks were dominated by men sharing this common ideology, sought to create circumstances in the developing world that would ensure change that was predictable, manageable, and consonant with the perceived economic and strategic interests of the United States. Joseph Palmer II, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, spoke to the importance of these interests when testifying before a House of Representatives committee in 1968. The respect of various African nations for our interests, Palmer noted, is illustrated "by their special facilities and rights made available to us, by our development of Africa's important mineral and other resources. United States investment in Africa has doubled," he continued, "in the last decade and has been involved in Africa's major output of such strategic minerals as copper, bauxite, iron ore, uranium, petroleum, manganese, and scarce minerals."²¹

It should be stressed that the assumptions underlying foundation policy in the developing world were widely shared and that the programs subsequently devised to

¹⁷ Godfrey Hodgson, "The Establishment," in *Beyond Containment: U.S. Foreign Policy in Transition*, ed. Robert W. Tucker and William Watts (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1973), p. 139.

¹⁸ Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 86.

¹⁹ Details of this support for the forces of the FNLA and UNITA can be found in Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: A Story of Stupidity," *The New York Review of Books*, December 21, 1978, pp. 26-30.

²⁰ Hodgson, "The Establishment," p. 138.

²¹ Quoted in Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*, p. 326.

implement this policy were the results of extended discussion and deliberate analysis on the part of foundation policy makers.

Hodgson has termed as "imperial liberalism" the ideology informing United States foreign policy during this period. The main tenets of this ideology were simple—the United States system worked at home and therefore the country should take whatever steps it deemed necessary to safeguard and extend that system abroad.²² Foundation policy makers and staff members were among those who subscribed to this ideology. Many of these same men had, in other policy positions, helped to formulate this ideology and to win its general acceptance. Dissent from the general consensus was muted, for to question it was, according to Hodgson, "to proclaim oneself irresponsible or ignorant," and to guarantee that one's opinions would not receive a hearing in important councils.²³

Materials in the archives of the major foundations provide no evidence of dissent at the time foundation staff were defining the range of their overseas programs. Given the broad societal consensus regarding the rectitude of America's imperial mission and the fact that the foundations tend to recruit staff from particular backgrounds, this absence of dissent is not surprising. It has been suggested that the decade of the 1950s was the time when the United States had moved beyond ideology and was proceeding with the more important task of completing its technological and managerial revolution, which promised a better life for all. Foundation personnel saw little reason to question the beneficent effects of the exportation of this revolution to other less fortunate areas of the world.

As the overseas programs of the foundations expanded after 1955, particularly at Ford and Rockefeller, there was a commensurate increase in the personnel charged with implementing these programs around the world. Given the increasingly bureaucratic and hierarchical nature of these organizations, it followed that the policy decisions to undertake or to forego programs were made by a smaller proportion of the staff than previously, and that such policy was to be carried out by, for want of a better term, middle-level technocrats. Were these technocrats conscious of the ramifications of their overseas work? Were they aware, as were those who formulated foundation and foreign policy that certain intellectual systems liberate and others repress, and that "the old society maintains itself . . . through theories and ideologies that establish hegemony over the minds of men?"²⁴ Did they consider that their work might actually impede the social revolution that they claimed to champion? One suspects that few at this level considered their work in these terms, but rather that they set about implementing their programs in the hope that a number of people might benefit. By doing so, however unwittingly, they acted as servants to those who determined foundation policies consonant with the ideology of imperial liberalism, an ideology which was hardly designed with the best interests of the developing nations in mind.

Although the major foundations are frequently criticized as being vanguards of the

²² Godfrey Hodgson, *In Our Time: America from World War II to Nixon* (New York: Macmillan, 1976), p. 12.

²³ Hodgson, *In Our Time*, p. 72.

²⁴ Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology* (New York: Avon, 1971), pp. 5, 12.

anticapitalist revolution,²⁵ Nielsen, whose study of the major foundations is often cited for its balanced approach, claims that these institutions "are in fact overwhelmingly passive, conservative, and anchored to the *status quo*."²⁶ Given the composition of the boards of trustees of the major foundations, their shared ideology, and the socioeconomic strata from which they generally recruit their administrative personnel, this conservatism is hardly surprising.²⁷

Nor is it surprising that foundation officials share with business leaders and Washington policy makers a concern for the political stability of the territories in which they have programs. This mutual concern with stability has led to the overriding assumption on the parts of foundation officials, business leaders, and implementors of United States foreign policy, that change in the newly independent African nations must be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Packenham notes that the consensus among United States foreign policy makers holds that "radical politics, including intense conflict, disorder, violence, and revolution, are unnecessary for economic and political development and therefore are always bad."²⁸ In short, the measured and gradual development of African nations serves the best interest of world stability and, at the same time, provides an international context within which the major American foundations play crucial roles in developing national politics. This involvement has the further advantage of binding leaders of the new African nations, through the aegis of foundation-sponsored educational institutions, to political doctrines which, at the very least, are not overtly antagonistic to state-supported capitalist development.

American business leaders with interests overseas have remained concerned about the possible nationalization or outright seizure of their investments by nationalist or Communist regimes. They are equally concerned about the rise to power in the underdeveloped world of national leaders who might deny American corporate access to the sources of raw materials, or who might raise prices to such levels as to make the extraction of these raw materials unprofitable.²⁹ The almost pathological fear that these national leaders will act in ways damaging to American corporate interests has

²⁵ Rene A. Wormser's *Foundations: Their Power and Influence* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1968) is representative.

²⁶ Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, p. 406.

²⁷ In an interview on May 13, 1976, F. Champion Ward, who has long served in the Ford Foundation's International Division, commented on how graduates of the elite American universities prefer to work in the Foundation's New York office rather than in overseas field positions.

²⁸ Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World*, p. 132. See Barrington Moore, Jr.'s analysis of the efficacy of the revolutionary as opposed to the evolutionary path of development in his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

²⁹ Members of the Establishment frequently are quite explicit when discussing this issue. For example, Percy Bidwell, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations which generally reflects official Washington thinking, argued that "our purpose should be to encourage the expansion of low-cost production and to make sure that neither nationalistic policies nor Communist influences deny American industries access on reasonable terms to the basic materials necessary to the continued growth of the American economy." Percy W. Bidwell, "Raw Materials and National Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 37, No. 1 (1958), 153.

led the United States government to appraise national leaders in terms of their favorable disposition toward the American free enterprise system.³⁰ It has been hoped that socialization of African leaders in Western-oriented and foundation-supported educational institutions, both in Africa and in the United States, would enhance this favorable disposition. Vernon McKay, former State Department officer and an important adviser in the evolution of the African programs of the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation, has been quite explicit in delineating how the foundations' African involvement can serve American corporate interests. This foundation and government support for African educational institutions and other related projects is required, he noted, so that African participation in their economies can increase. This is important because "the more foreign enterprise is Africanized, the less likely it is to be nationalized."³¹

The architects of foundation policy in Africa form an identifiable elite whose control of significant amounts of money provides considerable leverage in the newly independent nations of Africa. As defined by foundation programs, this policy has intended, minimally, to support African leaders who favor gradualism over revolutionary nationalism, to provide an American presence in nations considered by the United States government and corporate structure to be of geopolitical or economic importance such as Nigeria, Zaire, and Ethiopia, and provide the intellectual tools and socializing experience, through support of educational institutions, to enable a generation of Africans to accept the superiority of the Western-oriented, democratic-capitalist development model over its socialist counterpart.

While on the one hand American democracy requires lip service to the ideals of national independence and territorial integrity in the developing nations, the dominant thinking of the post-1945 period, as Kolko succinctly concludes, held that "the future of American economic power [was] too deeply involved for this nation to permit the rest of the world to take its own political and revolutionary course in a manner that imperil[ed] the American freedom to use them."³² Appropriate measures had to be taken to assure American access to resources important to the United States. These measures could be subtle, in the form of influencing important individuals through training or in the form of institutional development supported by official aid programs or by foundation largesse. The measures could be less subtle, taking the form of bribes, or even brutal, as, for example, in the American interventions in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and ultimately Vietnam. Whatever the means, many important policy makers subscribed to the sentiments of Walt Rostow, a frequent beneficiary of foundation support, who wrote "that the security and well-being of the United States, even its very survival as a free nation, was dependent upon the utilization and application of its power to shape the international environment in a manner compatible with

³⁰ Rene Lemarchand, "The CIA in Africa: How Central? How Intelligent?" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14, No. 3 (1976), speaks to this point in the following terms: "whether African leaders are seen as 'friends' or 'enemies' also depends on the relative compatibility of their policies with the magnitude of United States economic and strategic interests at stake in specific areas. Thus Zaire, Nigeria, and Ethiopia are generally seen as areas where a basic reorientation of economic and diplomatic choices by African governments would meet strong resistance from U.S. policy-makers" (p. 410).

³¹ Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, (New York: Harper, 1963), p. 282.

³² Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy*, p. 53.

American interests and security."³³ The Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations, through their support for various educational configurations, have played significant roles in attempting to so shape the international environment.

Foundation Programs in Africa

By the mid-1950s, then, a consensus had emerged among foundation officials, business leaders, and Washington policy makers regarding the importance of the developing world for the United States. The mutual concern for controlling development in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which enhanced American interests while simultaneously limiting Soviet influence, led the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations, frequently acting in concert, to support educational projects and developmental models which would bind foreign nationals and their institutions to the dominant values of the American corporate state.³⁴ These programs, which were designed to use educational institutions to encourage if not to ensure certain kinds of desirable behavior, clearly illustrate Gramsci's contention that certain classes control the sources of knowledge that in turn produce and preserve the several institutions of a given society for the benefit of the elites. By imposing its social construction of reality on those institutions, the dominant group achieves ideological hegemony by controlling the creation, dissemination, and valuation of knowledge. Only knowledge derived through approved means and certified by the hegemonic group as "real" is acceptable in the currency of the state.³⁵

The first of the foundation programs in Africa involved the creation of lead universities in areas considered important to the United States. Foundation personnel identified existing African institutions which possessed trusted and politically astute indigenous leadership, a minimal number of qualified professionals in key departments, an assured level of governmental support, the rudiments of an administrative infrastructure, and a general institutional willingness to adhere to the broad policy guidelines of the donor organizations. Personnel in the foundations' New York offices assumed responsibility for the overall planning and implementation of university policies, and the Ford and Rockefeller foundations supported field offices to coor-

³³ Quoted in Philip Green, "Necessity and Choice in American Foreign Policy" in *A Dissenter's Guide to Foreign Policy*, ed. Irving Howe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 132. Rostow's consistency on this issue is evidenced by an earlier comment, namely that, "our military security and our way of life as well as the fate of Western Europe and Japan are at stake in the evolution of the underdeveloped areas." Quoted in Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*, p. 131, from the *Hearings of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, December 10, 12, 13, 1956.*

³⁴ On the foundations attempts to do so in Latin America, see Robert F. Arnove, "The Ford Foundation and 'Competency-Building' Overseas: Assumptions, Approaches, and Outcomes," in *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 12 (1977), 100-126.

³⁵ For a full discussion of this, see Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quintin Hoare (New York: International Publishers, 1971). For a discussion of some of the other cultural mechanisms used by hegemonic groups to mold intellectual perspectives and to insure specific outcomes, see Louis Althusser's chapter entitled "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Toward an Investigation" in his *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London: New Left Books, 1971), pp. 123-173. I am currently working on a project to determine the implications of foundation ideology on the ascendancy of certain developmental models and the corresponding devaluation of other approaches.

dinate activities on a daily basis. New York personnel were dispatched to these local offices where they worked closely with their indigenous academic and administrative counterparts. Frequently, they spent periods ranging from one to three years as members or heads of academic departments, as deans, and as heads of or advisors to key administrative units within the universities. Given the logistical complications of these sizable ventures, it is not surprising that there was considerable movement of personnel, both from the foundations and from among the African leadership cadre, between the lead universities and the foundations' New York offices. When the Africans, generally the university principals, arrived in New York for periodic consultations, foundation officers arranged for them to meet with representatives of other aid agencies, such as the World Bank and the Agency for International Development (AID).

The second major program emphasized the development and strengthening of social-science departments, particularly in the related field of human resource development. This was accomplished by placing in social-science departments a foundation representative or carefully selected American or British academic charged with guiding and directing the department during its formative years, and by choosing African nationals who showed professional promise for advanced graduate training in a limited number of elite American institutions. These social scientists, indigenous as well as expatriate, often divided their academic responsibilities between a social-science department and a foundation-supported research institute linked to the department. The emphasis within the former was on teaching while the latter was primarily concerned with the application of social-science research to the alleviation of societal problems. The social-science methodologies which the Africans generally used to study problems within their societies were shaped in American institutions and, consequently, reflected dominant American ideologies.

The foundations' third emphasis was on the training of public administrators. Under the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation, these programs were implemented either within a university department or, on occasion, through an independent precollegiate level institution whose exclusive purpose was the training of civil servants. The Ford Foundation-created National School of Law and Administration, which opened with two hundred students in 1961, was representative of the latter approach. In this and similar institutions, foundation policy determined the course of study, played a crucial role in the selection of staff and students, and ensured the general institutional direction through the designation of high-level administrators. There was constant interaction between the foundation's field-office personnel and those in the institutes or departments of public administration. As in the case of other aspects of the foundations' educational involvement in Africa, visits to these institutions by New York-based officers occurred on a regular basis.

A fourth program centered on teacher education. The work of the Carnegie Corporation is particularly noteworthy in this context, although the other foundations, particularly Ford, did make a contribution. The Corporation set out in the mid-1950s to establish links with most of the postsecondary teacher-training institutions in English-speaking Africa. To do so, it funded programs developed by major teacher-training institutions in both the United States and in the United Kingdom. Personnel from the American and British institutions were sent to the African institutions—only some of which were linked to universities during the early period—to work with their

local counterparts in constructing curricula, improving teaching methods, searching for more efficient ways of supervising student teachers, and finally, attempting to rationalize the relationship between teacher training, rapidly expanding school populations, and the requirements of developing economies which would be increasingly responsive to the dictates of the man-power planning schema. This teacher-education work paralleled the social science emphasis in the foundation-sponsored advanced training of African nationals in American teacher-training institutions. American and British professors, in consultation with foundation personnel, identified promising African teacher-educators or administrators and recommended funding for their further study in American institutions. As with other aspects of foundation involvement in African education, the teacher-education work was marked by the constant movement of American university and foundation personnel to African institutions and of favored Africans to the United States.

The fifth major program involved the advanced training made available to African nationals in elite universities in the United States and these students' eventual return home to assume positions of leadership within local universities, teacher-training institutions, or ministries of education. Another important aspect of the foundations' work in Africa is United States-based university programs that enabled American scholars to study various aspects of selected African societies. The purpose of this training was, as a Ford vice-president wrote to his Carnegie counterpart in 1954, "to put such knowledge more effectively at the disposal of those who are responsible, in government and private life, for representing the United States in international affairs."³⁶

The following analyses of each of these program efforts will illustrate the attempts by foundation personnel to train a generation of African leaders sympathetic to the interests of the United States, and to train a generation of American scholars who would place their knowledge at the service of the American corporate state.

Lead Universities

After extended discussion, the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation decided to increase the Foundation's activities in the developing world, and late in 1955, the trustees voted to appropriate \$5,000,000 annually for five years to support this work. The focus immediately turned to fostering university centers of excellence in selected developing countries.³⁷ These lead universities would play important roles in the creation of a leadership, which, in the words of Foundation President Dean Rusk, would help to sustain "the orderliness of economic growth. The objective is one that engages directly the self-interest of the economically more advanced peoples and calls for their understanding and assistance."³⁸

³⁶ Don K. Price to John W. Gardner, March 24, 1954, Ford Foundation International Training and Research Papers, Administration, Board of Overseas Training and Research Meeting, March 31, 1954, Ford Foundation archives (hereafter FF). An internal consensus on this point had been reached some six months earlier. See, for example, the minutes of the September 15, 1953, meeting of the Board of Training and Research. It is extremely doubtful that Henry Ford II really could have been ignorant of such an emphasis.

³⁷ The justification for this step is provided by Rockefeller Foundation President Dean Rusk in his "Background for Proposal of Increased Programs in Non-Western Underdeveloped Areas, Memorandum to the Trustees," November 29, 1955. Folder 900, Pro, Unar-6, RFNYC.

³⁸ *Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1958*, p. 128.

The Ford Foundation's interest in the developing world crystallized during the mid-1950s, and was directly related to the increased communist attention to Asia and Africa. The perceived Communist offensive could be blunted, in the words of a Ford official, by "appropriate activities supported by a private American foundation" which "could contribute to African confidence in the United States and the free world."³⁹ Another catalyst to this interest in Africa was a Ford study in the early 1950s which confirmed the suspected "abysmal lack of knowledge" about the underdeveloped areas of the world on the part of policy makers in the United States.⁴⁰ Foundation personnel were convinced that a primary responsibility of the Foundation was to ensure that "the training [provided by Ford] . . . advance, either directly or indirectly, United States interests abroad."⁴¹ The foundation's decision to undertake programs in India and South Asia had been made for similar reasons.⁴²

The decision of the Ford Foundation to concentrate its African programs on the training of elites in public administration, agricultural economics, the applied sciences, and the social sciences, and to strengthen African universities and other post-secondary institutions for this purpose was a logical extension of similar emphases in the Foundation's domestic activities. Its concern with nurturing an academic and intellectual elite, which would play the leadership role in the domestic polity, found its best expression in the work of the Ford-created-and-supported Fund for the Advancement of Education.⁴³

Ford and Fund officials thought they could nurture, through training offered in elite United States universities, potential leaders whose outlook and values would ensure their support of the dominant United States social, economic, and political institutions. These Ford-nurtured leaders would then assume their places as executives of major African institutions, where they would continue to uphold the interests of society's dominant classes. The assumption was that those trained in a particular way at specific institutions were best fitted to run the key institutions of African society. Ford policy held that this approach was technocratic, nonideological, and only designed to assure that society's future leaders would receive the most appropriate training for the difficult tasks before them. From Ford's perspective, there seemed little reason to doubt the efficacy of exporting a similar theory and *modus operandi* to the developing nations.

The concern with world stability and the need to incorporate peripheral areas into the American-dominated world capitalist system led the foundations to concentrate their university programs in African areas considered of strategic and economic importance to the United States government and American corporations with African

³⁹ Don K. Price to Rowan Gaither, June 12, 1956. FF International Training and Research Papers, Administration, Training and Research Africa.

⁴⁰ The study was undertaken by Carl Spaeth and focused primarily, although not exclusively, on the state of knowledge in the United States about Asia. See his "A Survey of Asian Studies," FF archives report 001066. The quotation is from Melvin J. Fox, Oral History Transcript, FF, p. 72.

⁴¹ Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Training and Research, September 15, 1953, FF.

⁴² John B. Howard, Oral History Transcript, FF, p. 5.

⁴³ For details on the work of the Fund for the Advancement of Education, see Dennis C. Buss, "The Ford Foundation and the Exercise of Power in American Public Education," Diss. Rutgers Univ. 1972.

investments.⁴⁴ To this end, the Ford Foundation's most significant postsecondary educational undertakings were in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Congo/Zaire and in a combined university scheme linking the East African nations of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Rockefeller funds were concentrated on an East African interterritorial scheme, in Nigeria, and more recently, in Zaire.

The strategic, economic, and political importance of Nigeria for West Africa, indeed for all of Africa, is the result of its population base (almost one-quarter of Africa's total), its mineral resources (the world's sixth leading oil exporter), and its geopolitical mass (bestriding the Bights of Benin and Biafra and spreading to the Sahara). Ford Foundation personnel early recognized Nigeria's importance to the stability of the region and as an area for potential investment by American corporations. Between 1958 and 1969, Ford spent approximately \$25 million there, a figure representing almost two-thirds of its total West African expenditure during that period. Of this amount, almost \$8 million went to underwrite university development, and some \$5 million of that was allocated to the University of Ibadan. If we include in this total the \$2.3 million designated for economic development and planning, most of which was sponsored by the University of Ibadan, and the \$3.9 million spent on training programs in public administration, the total expenditure on university education in Nigeria by Ford was approximately \$15 million, by far the most significant share of the total Nigerian expenditure.⁴⁵ The Rockefeller Foundation, in addition, allocated some \$9 million to the University of Ibadan in the decade from 1963 to 1972.⁴⁶ The concentration of Rockefeller money in the University of Ibadan and in its other University Development Centers around the world, one of which was the University of East Africa scheme, meant, in the words of a prominent Foundation official, that "our dollars will . . . be able to exert an extraordinary leverage."⁴⁷

Foundation Emphasis on Social-Science Research

Both the Ford and Rockefeller foundations place such great emphasis on the development of the social sciences at the lead universities they supported in Africa because of their belief in the efficacy of the social sciences to bring about "rationally managed" social change.⁴⁸ Rockefeller Foundation personnel early recognized the potential of the social sciences to effect change in the developing world that would be favorable to the industrialized nations, particularly in the United States. In a wide-ranging discussion preliminary to the Foundation's mid-1950s decision to expand its overseas work, a

⁴⁴ For an elaboration of the relationship of peripheral areas to metropolitan economic and political centers, see Johann Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" *Journal of Peace Studies*, 2 (1971), 81-117; and Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly, *Education and Colonialism* (New York: Longmans, 1978).

⁴⁵ Melvin J. Fox, "Education Goals and Achievements, Future Prospects," paper prepared for Ford Foundation Staff Conference, June 9-11, 1970, pp. 1-10 of Appendix. FF report 002387.

⁴⁶ "The Rockefeller Foundation University Development Program, University Development Centers Expenditures, Allocations and Appropriations, 1963-72." Folder 900 Pro Unar-14, RFNYC.

⁴⁷ Robert S. Morison to J. George Harrar and Staff, January 26, 1961. Folder 900: Program and Policy Underdeveloped Areas 1961-63, RFNYC.

⁴⁸ Trent Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination* (New York: Braziller, 1973), p. 220.

Foundation officer noted the role of the social sciences in helping to "serve the orderly evolution of the unindustrialized countries."⁴⁹

The conventional wisdom regarding development in the Third World during the 1960s held that the key lay in the creation of technocratically-oriented elites with social-science competencies which could be applied to the alleviation of the problems of underdevelopment. According to Arnove, "the [Ford] Foundation's fascination with social-science research in large part has consisted of support for a certain breed of economists whose quantitative approach to development is safe and respectable. This favoring of economists, particularly in the early sixties, has accorded with the Foundation's approach to treating development 'in terms of economic growth, technological competence, and improved managerial competence.'"⁵⁰ At the University of Ibadan, both Ford and Rockefeller invested heavily in the development of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research and its related departments of economics, political science, and sociology. At the University of East Africa, generously supported by both foundations, the institutional bases for social science research were the East African Institute of Social Research in Uganda and the Institute for Development Studies in Kenya. In East Africa, as in Nigeria, heavy emphasis was placed on the development of the departments of economics, political science, and sociology.

It was through the strengthening of the social sciences and the application of the manpower planning approach, grounded in economics, that the major foundations hoped to achieve the orderly growth of educational systems and subsequently of nations in Africa. In the late 1950s, the Carnegie Corporation sponsored the much-heralded Ashby Commission study of educational needs in Nigeria.⁵¹ A crucial aspect of that study was a manpower projection forecast for the period 1960-1980, by Princeton University economist Frederick Harbison. His estimates of the high-level manpower requirements for Nigeria during the 1960-1980 period were followed by estimates of the kinds and quantity of schools required to fulfill those needs. The evident success of the manpower-planning schema in the Ashby report led this human resources theory of development to win numerous adherents during the next few years.

Ford Foundation personnel supported this approach because of their interest in the application of social-science research techniques, which they claimed were value-free, to developmental problems, and because Harbison's work seemed marked by rigorous methodology. The Ford staff not only accepted the efficacy of the manpower planning approach as related to educational development, but, to encourage its dissemination, teamed with the Carnegie Corporation in 1960 to underwrite a major research project. Based at Princeton University, its purpose was to study the role of education and high-level manpower in the modernization process. The book resulting from this research, *Education, Manpower, and Economic Growth*, was presented by its foundation spon-

⁴⁹ Joseph H. Willets, "Preliminary Conclusions from the Study of Crete," March 8, 1949, Folder 900, Pro, Unar-2, RFNYC.

⁵⁰ Arnove, "The Ford Foundation and 'Competency-Building' Overseas," p. 118. For an elaboration of this point on the part of the Rockefeller Foundation, see Kenneth W. Thompson to Social Science Staff, December 9, 1960, Folder 900; Program and Policy, Underdeveloped Areas, RFNYC.

⁵¹ The Document was entitled *Investment in Education: The Report of the Commission of Post-Secondary School Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1960), but is generally referred to as the Ashby Commission Report after its chairman, Sir Eric Ashby.

sors as incontestable evidence supporting the effectiveness of the manpower planning approach to development.⁵²

Educational reform based on a theory of human resource development and elite mobilization is basically conservative, since its primary task is, according to Paulston, "to facilitate investment in personal development and to produce 'better' workers within the context of the existing educational and social system."⁵³ This emphasis on human resource development and technocratically-oriented elites assumes, in short, that change can only flow from the top down, that change should be led and orchestrated by an elite with approved training which supports the existing social order. This view, so often passed off as nonideological, is, according to Barber, "permeated by instrumental values such as stability (homeostasis) and efficiency ('good functioning' per se) that give it a static and politically conservative temper."⁵⁴ African national leaders who subscribed to this viewpoint were more likely to be bound to the developmental perspectives and the political and economic institutions of the United States than were those who did not.

It was an article of faith that the Ford Foundation's value-free development expert would carry with him to Africa the appropriate technology to help further the development effort. Although this American-produced technology often had not proven successful at home, it was assumed, *ipso facto*, that its application in Africa would hasten social development. Melvin Fox, a Ford representative with extensive knowledge of West Africa, noted that the technicians around the Foundation believed that they could transfer the techniques necessary for modernization and that once those were transferred, modernization would be automatic. It was generally believed that in areas like Africa the transference of skills through expatriate advisors would initiate the gradual movement toward modernization.⁵⁵ For all Ford's emphasis on empirical social-science research methodologies and data aggregation in both its domestic and overseas work, little attention was paid to the information collected on the efficacy of particular educational innovations at home before they were exported.⁵⁶

Even those closest to Ford's work have expressed serious reservations about its African accomplishments. Despite Ford's professed rationality and logical planning in "the building of public services, education, and research on social and economic problems"⁵⁷ in Africa, a Ford official characterized the massive educational expenditures there as suffering from a diffusion of effort as too many people attempted to try out their pet schemes.⁵⁸ Farrell contends that the exportation to developing nations of educational gadgetry untested in the United States is a blatant manifestation of "in-

⁵² For details, see E. Jefferson Murphy, *Creative Philanthropy: Carnegie Corporation and African Education, 1953-1973* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1976), pp. 86-87.

⁵³ Rolland G. Paulston, *Conflicting Theories of Social and Educational Change: A Typological Review* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1976), p. 15.

⁵⁴ Benjamin R. Barber, "Science, Salience and Comparative Education: Some Reflections on Social Scientific Inquiry," *Comparative Education Review*, 16 (1972), 435.

⁵⁵ Fox, Oral History Transcript, p. 217.

⁵⁶ Apropos this, see Arnone, "The Ford Foundation and 'Competency-Building' Overseas," and Buss, "The Ford Foundation," December 1970, p. 4. Copy at FF.

⁵⁷ Francis X. Sutton, "Africa Ten Years Later," TS, p. 217.

⁵⁸ Fox, FF archives report 002387, p. 19.

tellectual colonialism." He argues that "one of the greatest mistakes of the last decade was the tendency of many Western academics to use the poor nations as laboratories for testing out theoretically interesting educational novelties which they have been unable to sell completely in their own societies" and that "it is time that we got out of the business of peddling untried universal nostrums once and for all."⁵⁹

If a few Ford field representatives had reservations concerning the efficacy of the Foundation's emphasis on the social sciences and human-resource development theory as the panacea for underdevelopment, Rockefeller personnel did not share these qualms. The Rockefeller Foundation assured the orientation toward the corporate-capitalist development model by placing its African fellowship recipients in the social sciences in elite United States universities, whose emphasis on the functional view of society and the human-resources theory of development was pronounced, and by employing only those expatriates whose academic approach subscribed to these viewpoints to teach at the universities of Ibadan and East Africa during the universities' formative periods.⁶⁰

The ability of the Rockefeller Foundation to determine an intellectual perspective is suggested by Kenneth W. Thompson, former vice-president of the Foundation, who notes that "66 per cent of all East African faculty have been Rockefeller Foundation scholars and holders of Special Lectureships established with Rockefeller Foundation funding for returning national scholars." If the sample is limited to only professors and deans, the percentage of university personnel beholden to the Rockefeller Foundation for part or all of its training rises to eighty.⁶¹ Nor was the impact less at the University of Ibadan, as a 1975 Rockefeller document indicates. Through the middle of that year the Foundation had supported 114 Nigerian fellows, of whom 73 were then on the Ibadan staff. The Foundation has also provided 107 man-years of teaching for the University by carefully selected non-Nigerian expatriates. In the words of the report: "It is evident that the American-trained faculty members—whether provided as visiting faculty or trained in this country under the fellowship programs—have had a major impact on the instructional program . . . Nigerian staff development has been given the highest priority in the social-science program. . . . The Economics Department . . . is staffed largely by individuals who have received training awards from the Foundation."⁶²

The foundations relied heavily on "value-free" social-science research techniques and established research parameters designed to investigate only certain predetermined phenomena. This precluded the examination of those phenomena whose in-

⁵⁹ Joseph P. Farrell, "A Reaction to 'The Micro-Planning of Education: Why It Fails, Why It Survives, and the Alternatives,'" *Comparative Education Review*, 19, (1975), 208-209.

⁶⁰ For specifics on the placement of Rockefeller-funded students, see *The Rockefeller Foundation Director of Fellowships and Scholarships, 1917-1970* (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1972). A perusal of the Rockefeller foundation materials related to recruitment of overseas staff indicates the great care taken to select the "right" personnel.

⁶¹ Kenneth W. Thompson and colleagues, "Higher Education and National Development: One Model for Technical Assistance," in *Education and Development Reconsidered: The Bellagio Conference Papers*, ed. F. Champion Ward (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 201.

⁶² From "University Development, Education for Development Program Review," n.d., October 14, 1975. Folder 900: Programs and Policies. UNAR-16, p. 33, RFNYC.

vestigation might upset the equilibrium of societies whose fundamental structures they supported, and in which they could exercise significant influence. This also meant that the foundations supported programs and approaches that promised evolutionary, elite-directed change as opposed to revolutionary, mass-directed change.

Schroyer's comments are germane to the subject of foundation support for the social sciences, which since 1945 has been as significant in the United States as in the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. "While ostensibly maturing in its research techniques and becoming increasingly freed from value judgements," he writes,

it is obvious that the drift of contemporary social science is toward a science that serves existing administrative systems. Too often the knowledge produced becomes useful only as a means to control "social problems" and to re-establish a social equilibrium that takes for granted the existing institutional constellations. Methodologically we have begun to recognize that in so far as social-science knowledge is generated in a way which presupposes existing societal arrangements as so many "initial conditions," the knowledge produced will be "true" only in the sense that it is a set of propositions whose usefulness contributes to the *control* of these social processes.⁶³

Programs in Public Administration

The foci of the Ford Foundation programs in public administration were at Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria, the University of East Africa, and at the National School of Law and Administration in the Congo. In terms of strategic location, mineral wealth, and political potential, the Congo appeared significant to Ford officials during the late 1950s and early 1960s. This perception of the Congo was shared by State Department officers, with whom Ford officials consulted regularly concerning their ventures there. The relationships linking the Foundation to State Department policy makers and to the Central Intelligence Agency in the exercise of United States foreign policy stand in clear relief through an examination of Ford's programs there, particularly those in the field of public administration.

Consultations in 1959 and early 1960 between the United States ambassador to Brussels and the director of Ford's International Affairs program resulted in a joint Ford-State Department program to support the visit to the United States of carefully selected, prominent Congolese. These visits represented "a deliberate official effort to make contact with Congolese leaders of today and tomorrow," to acquaint them with the major American aid organizations, official government bodies, and the "well-established private banking and business institutions with definite interests in Africa and especially in the Congo."⁶⁴

This initial Ford interest, on the eve of Congolese independence, soon led to a more substantial endeavor in the Congo itself. This was also a joint Ford-State Department effort and involved the establishment of the Center for Research and Socio-Polit-

⁶³ Trent Schroyer, "The Need for Critical Theory," *The Insurgent Socialist*, 3, No. 2 (1973), 34. For an influential voice arguing the possibility of a "value-free" social science, see Peter L. Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1974); and Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

⁶⁴ Henry H. Lunau, "Interim Report on the Congolese Leader Project," August 11, 1960, p. 2. FF Grant File FA 60-165.

ical Information for data collection and the training of Congolese leaders in Leopoldville.⁶⁵ It seems likely that this initiative resulted from conversations by Foundation personnel in Brussels coupled with the suggestion of an official of the Governmental Affairs Institute in Washington, D.C. that in order to preclude the duplication of services "an institution such as the Ford Foundation would consider setting up a small clearing-house . . . in the Congo as a focal point to which all parties interested in aiding and assisting the Congo could turn for expert advice and information."⁶⁶ Whatever the immediate catalyst, the Foundation responded with grants totaling \$232,000 to support this venture for a five-year period from 1960.

This center was not nearly as important for the subsequent political development of the Congo, however, as Ford's next undertaking there—a National School of Law and Administration. The National School concept grew out of Ford's interest in training an elite group of administrative leaders. The success of the National School is suggested by Ashley, who notes that "by 1968, the 400-odd graduates of the school made up an elite corps of civil servants who are now holding important administrative and judicial posts throughout the Congo." It is of more than just passing interest that the first and influential Secretary-General of the National School was James T. Harris, who, according to Ashley, was "a Foundation specialist who had formerly served with the American Society of African Culture and had been president of the U.S. National Student Association."⁶⁷ What Ashley neglects to tell us is that it has been alleged that Harris was long an important and valued Central Intelligence Agency operative, who was an active agent at the time he administered the Ford-organized National School in the early 1960s.⁶⁸ Harris had been recommended for the Congo post by David Heaps, who joined the Foundation staff in 1960 and with Harris played a central role in the fortunes of the National School.⁶⁹ Before coming to the Ford Foundation, Heaps had worked for a number of international organizations, including four years spent as a program consultant to the Paris-based World Veterans Federation, which, according to one of Heaps's Ford colleagues, was also funded by the CIA.⁷⁰

Between 1961 and 1970, when it phased out its program, the Ford Foundation granted over \$3 million for the work of the National School of Law and Administration. Because of the influence it exerted in American foreign-policy matters, the Foundation could also exert leverage on the International Cooperation Administration, the precursor to AID, to allocate funds for the work there. In this connection the comments of James L. Morrill, a prominent Ford official, noting that Foundation representatives consulted regularly with Federal agencies about the Foundation's overseas work, commented that the United States government and the Foundation "had, of course, very similar objectives."⁷¹

Ashley, former Ford program officer and a sympathetic observer of the Founda-

⁶⁵ Some details are provided in Walter E. Ashley, "Philanthropy and Government: A Study of the Ford Foundation's Overseas Activities," Diss. New York Univ. 1970, Ch. 6.

⁶⁶ See note 58. Emphasis in original, p. 5.

⁶⁷ Ashley, "Philanthropy and Government," pp. 94-95.

⁶⁸ For an indication of Harris's activities on behalf of the CIA and its friends, see Dan Schechter, Michael Ansara, and David Kolodney, "The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer," *Ramparts*, 7, (1969), 25-33.

⁶⁹ David Heaps to F. X. Sutton, November 28, 1960, FF Grant File PA 61-103.

⁷⁰ Fox, Oral History Transcript, pp. 112-113.

⁷¹ James L. Morrill, Oral History Transcript, FF, p. 20.

tion's overseas activities, sums up the relationship between the Foundation and the American foreign policy nexus during the 1960s as follows:

From the standpoint of the U. S. government, Ford activity in the Congo has been useful in furthering foreign policy objectives. The United States has been successful in its main political objectives of helping to create an independent Congo not subject to Communist influence. It has been able to do this by relying on the United Nations for peacekeeping and on the Ford Foundation for helping initiate the key institutions for the training of administrators. . . . Ford assistance has therefore been an important element in furthering U.S. interests in Africa.⁷²

There is thus little reason to expect that the foundation officers' view of the appropriate direction of United States foreign policy would alter appreciably when they moved from an important official position in Washington to an equally important, but unofficial, one in a New York-based foundation. Indeed, it is just this shared ideology that leads Halberstam to characterize the major foundations as "the shadow-cabinet world."⁷³ James Morrill summed up what many insiders probably felt about the foundations' role as the silent partners in the American foreign-policy establishment when he noted that "we [the foundations] got further [than the federal government agencies] because nobody had any reason to suspect us."⁷⁴ However, his conclusion that the foundations "got further" may be more accurate than his opinion that no one suspected the foundations of collusion.

Elaborating on the role of the major foundations overseas, Robert I. Fleming, former director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund program in West Africa, states that since World War II the government's and the foundations' assistance programs have been "striving to thwart communism, sell America's producers' goods, raise foreign living standards, or all three at once." To further the second of these objectives, Fleming suggested that the foundations support an economic advisor to each of the host governments and help to establish "investment promotion centers."⁷⁵

The Ford Foundation consistently has stressed that its interest in training administrative leaders in Africa derives solely from its concern for the education of public servants capable of providing basic administrative services in areas woefully lacking in any semblance of an independent civil service. Given the economic interests of the United States in the developing nations where foundation programs have been concentrated and the role of the United States government in furthering these interests, one wonders if perhaps Gouldner's assessment may not be closer to the mark. "It is central," he notes, "to the effectiveness of a society using a system of 'indirect rule' that its organizational instruments be reliably controllable from the outside. The society thus depends greatly on appropriate socialization and education of the *ad-*

⁷² Ashley, "Philanthropy and Government," p. 97. On the role of the United Nations in the Congo at this time, see Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Murderous Angels* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), and Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo since Independence, January 1960–December 1961* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965).

⁷³ David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1973), p. 377.

⁷⁴ Morrill, Oral History Transcript, p. 21.

⁷⁵ Robert I. Fleming, "Program for Accelerating Private Foreign Investment in Less Developed Countries," FF archives report 00358, 1966, pp. 1–2.

ministrative and political classes. These develop expert skills and create a readiness to credit the hegemonic class, to define it as a 'responsible' and effective stratum dedicated to the commonweal; they define its role as legitimate and also generate loyalty to the social system."⁷⁶ The outside interests, of course, are Western corporate and financial institutions with significant investments in developing areas. The "expert skills" are learned in foundation-sponsored programs, and the new administrative and political classes indicate to the society at large the benevolence of their rule while minimizing the debts they as a class owe to the outside interests, who benefit more than do the local nationals.

Teacher-Education Projects

From 1950 to 1970 the work of the Carnegie Corporation in Africa followed lines that were different but complementary to those of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. The Corporation's emphasis on higher education, which became noticeable after Alan Pifer joined the staff in 1953, was further delineated to focus on teacher education. The available evidence suggests that this focus resulted from the discovery in the late 1950s of an institution in the United States which was not only heavily involved in teacher education, but was also interested in exporting to Africa some of its accumulated expertise in this field.⁷⁷ In 1960, Columbia University's Teachers College received the first of several substantial grants from Carnegie for a cooperative Afro-Anglo-American program in teacher education. The purpose of the program was to train African teacher-educators at Teachers College, to prepare Americans desirous of teaching in Africa at Teachers College and at the University of London's Institute of Education, and to allow Teachers College, and by extension, United States pedagogical principles and values to gain entry into the evolving network of teacher-training institutions in previously British Africa.⁷⁸

The cooperative relationships which the Corporation had evolved with British officialdom since the 1920s soon paid handsome dividends. Without the cooperation of representatives of the British African colonial establishment, the rapid expansion of Carnegie's teacher-training program in Africa could not have been realized. An important individual who helped to facilitate Carnegie's entry into African teacher-education institutes via the Teachers College Afro-Anglo-American program was L. J. Lewis, formerly a colonial official in Nigeria, former head of the Department of Education at Ghana's University College, and from the late 1950s the head of the influential Department of Education in Tropical Areas at the University of London's Institute of Education. His counterpart and close friend at Teachers College was Karl W. Bigelow, who in 1952 had travelled to Africa under the auspices of Carnegie Corporation to familiarize himself with the English educational system there. In mid-1958,

⁷⁶ Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology*, p. 233. Italics added.

⁷⁷ As early as 1948 personnel at Teachers College, Columbia University began laying plans for the College's future involvement in international education projects. The strategy to be followed is mentioned several times in materials contained in Box 11, folder 11/12 of the Karl W. Bigelow papers, Teachers College Archives, New York City.

⁷⁸ Murphy, *Creative Philanthropy*, pp. 133-136, provides some details of the evolution of the Afro-Anglo-American Program in Teacher Education.

a Ford Foundation official discussed the Corporations' evolving teacher-training emphasis in Africa with Carnegie's Alan Pifer. Later that year another Ford official, aware of Bigelow's association with the Carnegie people, met with the Teachers College professor in London and was impressed enough to recommend that the Foundation support some of his African travel.⁷⁹

Shortly thereafter the Ford Foundation decided that, with the exception of a sizeable project in Northern Nigeria during the mid-1960s, and some curriculum development work in East Africa, it would leave teacher-education projects for the Carnegie people and several outside agencies to coordinate.⁸⁰ A Carnegie-sponsored meeting in London in 1960, attended by representatives of Teachers College, the British Colonial Office, the Carnegie Corporation, and colleges or universities in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Uganda, assured that the role of the Carnegie Corporation in African education would be significant for the foreseeable future.⁸¹

The influence of the Carnegie Corporation in an evolving teacher-training network in Africa is suggested by the amount of money, totalling some \$1.3 million, that the Corporation granted to Teachers College between 1960 and 1972.⁸² This amount represents only the grants given directly to Teachers College to administer agreed-upon programs, and does not include the sizeable amounts granted to the African colleges and institutes of education which were linked to Teachers College and Carnegie through curriculum development projects, fellowship and teacher-training programs, and a common ideology.

As Carnegie officials recognized that United States ties to the newly independent African nations needed to be strengthened, they began to search for ways, which they thought would be perceived by Africans as being apolitical, to ensure these connections. The Afro-Anglo-American program, whose profound significance I have discussed elsewhere, was increasingly viewed as the means to accomplish this end.⁸³

The foundations' links to United States foreign policy is further illustrated by the outcome of a 1960 meeting held at Princeton, New Jersey. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations, the Department of State, the International Cooperation Administration, the British Colonial

⁷⁹ F. X. Sutton, memorandum to files, November 10, 1958. FF General Correspondence 1958, file Africa.

⁸⁰ This project involved the School of Education, University of Wisconsin, in a teacher-training project in Northern Nigeria. See Lindley J. Stiles, "A Proposal for the Improvement of Teacher Education in Northern Nigeria," FF archives report 001951, June, 1964. Although the exact reasons behind the Ford decision to abandon the area of teacher training to the Carnegie Corporation are not spelled out, it may simply have resulted from a Foundation decision not to get further involved in an area in which it had little interest or expertise. Part of the reason may also have related to the fact that Ford personnel felt that "we have not been in a position to directly influence total education planning or curriculum development [in Nigeria]," "Information Paper: Middle East and Africa Program," FF archives report 001327, p. 18, December 1966. The most favored outside agency administering Ford-funded education projects in Africa was the Cambridge-based organization, Educational Services Incorporated.

⁸¹ Murphy, *Creative Philanthropy*, ch. 8.

⁸² See Murphy, *Creative Philanthropy*, pp. 245-166, for details of Carnegie appropriations for work in Africa.

⁸³ Edward H. Berman, "American Philanthropy and African Education: Toward an Analysis," *African Studies Review*, 20, No. 1 (1977), 80-81.

Office, the African-American Institute, and representatives of the three East African territories of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. The conferees noted especially the lack of qualified secondary school teachers available to the East African states during a period when it was hoped that school enrollments would increase significantly. Consequently, it was suggested that the foundations and the International Cooperation Administration pool their resources, identify a significant American teacher-training institution, and support that institution's efforts to train a large group of United States teachers to work in the rapidly expanding secondary school network in East Africa.⁸⁴ Because of its previous contacts with both the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation, it was not surprising that Teachers College, Columbia University, was designated as the training institution, and that Karl Bigelow was the chief negotiator in securing the contract. The awarding of this contract to Teachers College was a way of assuring that change in East Africa, at least that occurring through the educational system, would not be revolutionary.⁸⁵

Educational Opportunities for African Students in the United States

Personnel in the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations played major roles in providing opportunities for African students to study at American universities. Foundation representatives and State Department officials shared the belief that, in the words of a Ford officer, the "greatly expanded training of Africans at a number of other levels will be a critical need, and could make a decisive difference [in the outcome of the Cold War]."⁸⁶ This assessment followed a meeting called by the Assistant Secretary of State and attended by Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller representatives, at which time general agreement was expressed concerning the importance of encouraging foreign students to study in the United States.⁸⁷

The Ford Foundation's promotion of this general objective took the form of significant financial support for the Institute of International Education, which acted as a general clearinghouse for foreign students studying in the United States. The level of this support is indicated by the 1965 comment of a Ford official that "we run the U. S. Government a close race as contractor for IIE services (in the neighborhood of \$2.7 million of project funds in recent years)."⁸⁸ At the same time, the Foundation was

⁸⁴ Murphy, *Creative Philanthropy*, pp. 107-112.

⁸⁵ By this time Teacher College has received sizeable grants from the International Cooperation Administration for educational projects around the world. These were soon augmented by additional grants from the Peace Corps for training programs in New York. In order to insure the continuing flow of outside funding, which had become an important component of the College budget as well as a source of prestige within the academic community (and which was to become significantly larger), the Teachers College approach to educational change in developing nations was identical to that of the funding agencies themselves, i.e., gradual, moderate, and controllable. Details can be gleaned from a perusal of the Bigelow papers at Teachers College.

⁸⁶ Melvin J. Fox to John Howard, September 2, 1960. Ford Foundation, International Training and Research Papers, John Howard, Africa-Educational Exchange.

⁸⁷ This meeting was held on June 17, 1959, and included Melvin Fox of Ford, Alan Pifer of Carnegie, J. George Harrar of Rockefeller, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Thayer, and several others. For details: Melvin J. Fox to F. Champion Ward and John B. Howard, June 24, 1959, Ford Foundation General Correspondence, 1959, State Department file.

⁸⁸ F. C. Ward to Messrs. Grant, Kingsley, Stone, and Wilhelm, February 5, 1965. Institute of Interna-

heavily involved in the fortunes of the African-American Institute, which concentrated its exchange programs exclusively on African students. It is perhaps more than coincidence that in the early 1960s a Ford official, Waldemar Nielsen, left the Foundation to assume the presidency of the Institute.⁸⁹

In the previous section mention was made of the influence of one institution, Teachers College, in forging a common outlook among African students studying in the United States. An elaboration of this, as well as an indication of the influence of the Carnegie Corporation in recruiting African students, is provided by the comments of Karl W. Bigelow, the architect of the Teachers College-Carnegie liaison for African teacher education. In his report on the 1972 conference of the Association for Teacher Education in Africa, Bigelow notes that of the twenty-seven official African participants at the 1972 conference, 33 percent had Teachers College associations, primarily through earlier fellowships funded by Carnegie. He further notes that Teachers College was associated with all twenty African institutions comprising the Association's membership.⁹⁰

The Rockefeller Foundation list of fellowships in the social sciences awarded to Nigerians and East Africans, reveals a concentration of awards for study at a handful of elite United States institutions. Awards to study economics were most frequently given to students attending Stanford, Harvard, Michigan, and Chicago; Columbia University's Teachers College received the majority of the awards for the study of education.⁹¹

While there can be little doubt that African students were well educated at Stanford, Chicago, Michigan, Harvard, or Columbia, there is evidence to suggest that they were also being trained in methodologies and ideologies grounded in the Western, capitalist-oriented theory of development. This in turn has led to a restricted view of the "right" and "wrong" ways of looking at particular problems. Such a perspective, long encouraged by foundation policies, precluded the possibility of formulating a truly revolutionary approach to developmental problems. Consequently, the typical African approach to development tends to be cautious, modest, and as a result, ineffectual in accomplishing anything other than perpetuating the social and political structure.⁹² The restricted *weltanschauung* which so characterizes African development experts trained in Western or in Western-influenced institutions may indeed serve the best interests of the United States, but there is scant evidence that African development is being enhanced commensurately.

tional Education file, 1965, FF. For details of the long-standing foundation involvement in the work of the Institute of International Education, see Stephen Mark Halpern, "The Institute of International Education: A History," Diss. Columbia Univ. 1969.

⁸⁹ The work of the African-American Institute is discussed in Evelyn Jones Rich, "United States Government-Sponsored Higher Educational Programs for Africans, 1957-1970, with Special Attention to the Role of the African-American Institute," Diss. Columbia Univ. 1977.

⁹⁰ "Report on the ATEA 11th Conference in Addis Ababa, 26-31 March, 1972," by K. W. Bigelow, p. 2. Typescript copy in Bigelow papers, Teachers College archives.

⁹¹ These data are culled from "Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships in Social Sciences, East Africa, 1969-76"; and "Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships in Social Sciences, Nigeria, 1962-1976"; both documents uncatalogued and generously made available by officers of the Rockefeller Foundation.

⁹² For an explication of this, see Francis J. Method, "National Research and Development Capabilities in Education," in *Education and Development Reconsidered*, pp. 128-140. The argument in Barrington Moore, Jr.'s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* is worth recalling once again at this juncture.

Arnove's comments on the recruiting and training patterns which mark the Ford Foundation's Latin American programs are equally relevant when the focus is turned to Africa. In the case of Latin American students and Ford, three institutions—Harvard, Chicago, and Stanford—train the greatest proportion of Ford-sponsored Latin American educational researchers, planners, administrators, and faculty. But, as he comments, "the power of the Foundation is not that of dictating what will be studied. Its power consists in defining professional and intellectual parameters in determining who will receive support to study what subjects in what settings."⁹³ Or, as Harold Laski commented almost half a century ago: "The foundations do not control, simply because, in the direct and simple sense of the word, there is no need for them to do so. They have only to indicate the immediate direction of their minds for the whole university world to discover that it always meant to gravitate swiftly to that angle of the intellectual compass."⁹⁴

The foundation emphasis on education was part of a larger view that stability and the orderly and controlled growth of independent African nations was in the best interests of the United States and of the Africans themselves. Education was deemed important in giving African leaders an intellectual framework which would make them sympathetic to capitalist development and the efforts of the United States. Africans who demonstrated these proclivities stood a better chance of obtaining the prized fellowships than did those who may have evinced doubts regarding the conventional wisdom about African development. In this regard, Africans had little if any control over decisions which affected their lives, or on the directions which development programs in their countries ultimately assumed. Select American universities were chosen by foundation representatives to perform this important socializing task.

These procedures paralleled those of an earlier period of United States Foundation involvement in African education. During the 1920s and 1930s, officials of the Phelps-Stokes Fund attempted to bring to the United States Africans who were considered sympathetic to the Tuskegee philosophy, and who would then implement the philosophy's principles upon returning home. The cultivation and recruitment of the "safe" African during the period from 1920 to 1945 has by now been well-documented.⁹⁵ The evidence cited above strongly suggests that there were comparable attempts after World War II to bring to the United States the latter-day "safe" African, an individual who had accepted the necessity of incorporating into African educational systems Western pedagogical principles, content, and sociopolitical perspectives. If all went according to plan, these educators would train future African leaders who would be sympathetic to the viewpoints of the United States government and economic interests in Africa.

⁹³ Robert F. Arnove, "Foundations and the Transfer of Knowledge," paper prepared for the Conversation in the Disciplines: Universities and the New International Order, State University of New York at Buffalo, March 23-25, 1978, p. 20.

⁹⁴ Harold Laski, *The Dangers of Obedience and Other Essays* (New York and London: Harper, 1930), p. 174.

⁹⁵ See, for example, my "American Influence on African Education: The Role of the Phelps-Stokes Fund's Education Commissions," *Comparative Education Review*, 15 (1971); and "Tuskegee in Africa," *Journal of Negro Education*, 41 (1972).

The Training of America's Africanists

From the mid-1950s both Ford and Carnegie attempted to build up a group of competent and trusted Africanists in the major universities, to whom they could turn for the resolution of problems and the design of field projects. In 1952, the Ford Foundation sponsored a conference at Northwestern University to discuss the needs and directions of African studies in the United States, how training programs could be developed to benefit African development, and how knowledge about Africa within the United States could be increased. This led to the creation of several major centers of African studies in the United States, including those at Northwestern, Boston University, Columbia, Wisconsin, Indiana, and University of California, Los Angeles.⁹⁶ Africanists from these institutions were frequently involved in foundation-sponsored projects in Africa—conducting feasibility studies for proposed programs, consulting with the Africa Liaison Committee, or actually implementing field projects.

A 1951 Ford report led to the conviction “that one of the first things the Foundation should do was to train, to devise ways to build up more competence in the United States about those areas that in the post-War world we had to relate to in one way or another.”⁹⁷ This concern led to the growth of the Foreign Area Fellowship Program whereby apprentice United States social scientists had their overseas field research subsidized by prestigious and lucrative grants from the Ford Foundation. There was no ambiguity in the minds of Ford personnel as to the overall purposes of such a program. The minutes of a 1953 meeting of the Ford committee which administered the program make this evident. In response to a query “as to whether our concern was the training of persons to advance U. S. foreign policy, or what was our basic starting point, Mr. Swayzee [Ford Director of Research] indicated that the training was to advance, either directly or indirectly, U. S. interests abroad.”⁹⁸ Or, as another Ford official put the same matter several years later, “the general purpose of the Program has been . . . to provide the educational foundation for our new national interest in those areas [abroad].”⁹⁹

It was assumed that these fellows would make available to Washington policy makers their assessments of Third World situations considered important to the defense of the United States.¹⁰⁰ This and other Ford programs were, according to a Foundation official, regularly cleared with “the appropriate agencies in Washington.” While Washington policy makers “offered to assist in every appropriate way,” they were equally insistent “that care should be taken to avoid any governmental identification with these projects.”¹⁰¹ In such a way, official United States policy could be carried out by surrogate organizations which shared Washington’s *weltanschauung*.

⁹⁶ F. X. Sutton and David Smock, “The Ford Foundation and African Studies,” November 7, 1975, detail these early efforts. FF report 002168.

⁹⁷ Fox, Oral History Transcript, p. 72. This was the so-called Spaeth Report referred to in note 40 above.

⁹⁸ FF, BOTR meeting, September 15, 1953, minutes, p. 3.

⁹⁹ Don K. Price to Henry T. Head, February 7, 1958. International Training and Research Program Papers, Administration, FF.

¹⁰⁰ Howard, Oral History Project, pp. 109-110.

¹⁰¹ Cleon O. Swayzee to John S. Dickey, June 15, 1953, FF International Training and Research Papers, Administration, Board of Overseas Training and Research Meeting, May 5, 1953; James Morrill, Oral History Transcript, pp. 19-22.

Indeed, so strongly did Ford officials feel about the potential service which returned fellows could offer through established channels to policy makers, that they were concerned over attempts by agents of the CIA to extract information from them. When CIA overtures to Ford Fellows became known, Ford officials were furious. According to one of the latter, Foundation president Heald "went down [to Washington] and he raised hell. . . . We just said, Jesus Christ! If the cover blows on any one of these things, everything we're doing will be jeopardized. . . . The whole notion that we tried to impress on the CIA was that . . . it was much more in the national interest that we train a bunch of people who at later stages might want to go with the CIA . . . than it was for them to have one guy that they could call their source of information."¹⁰²

While the Ford Foundation was initiating its program to train United States Africanists who would provide assessments important to United States strategic and economic interests in Africa, the trustees of the Carnegie Corporation appropriated funds to enable the Council on Foreign Relations to identify and encourage important Americans to undertake study tours of Africa. Carnegie's officers felt that a greater understanding of Africa by these individuals was required for the interests of the United States and for an American contribution to African development in the post-independence era. Those who travelled to Africa at Carnegie expense between 1959 and 1961 included David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank; Paul Nitze, who in 1962 became Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and Thomas Finletter, former Secretary of the Air Force.¹⁰³

The influence of the major foundations in shaping the intellectual parameters within which American Africanists function is suggested by a 1967 study conducted by the State Department. That report noted that 107 of the 191 university centers of foreign-affairs research depend primarily on support from the Ford Foundation. Horowitz notes that "in 11 of the 12 top universities with institutes of international studies, a single foundation, Ford, is the principal source of funds."¹⁰⁴

Foundation Cooperation for African Education and Political Development

The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the Carnegie Corporation, as a matter of policy, established or supported institutions and individuals capable of implementing programs desired by them.¹⁰⁵ Often, as in the case of the Afro-Anglo-American program based at Teachers College, one of the foundations was looking for an agency to implement its policy just as an educational institution was searching for a sponsor for a particular project. A marriage of convenience then resulted, whereby the foundation subsidized the institution while the latter implemented foundation-supported programs. The large foundations often jointly supported Africa-related projects; the establishment of the early African area studies center at Northwestern University, for

¹⁰² Howard, Oral History Transcript, pp. 109-110.

¹⁰³ Richard D. Heyman, "The Role of Carnegie Corporation in African Education, 1925-1960," Diss. Columbia Univ. 1970, p. 201.

¹⁰⁴ David Horowitz, "Sinews of Empire," *Ramparts*, October 1968, 33.

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, Alfred Wolf's memorandum to Francis X. Sutton, July 23, 1958, about the former's discussion of Carnegie's African programs with Alan Pifer, FF General Correspondence, 1958, Carnegie Corporation file.

example, was as much a concern of the Carnegie Corporation as it was of the Ford Foundation.¹⁰⁶

The close contacts maintained by the officers of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations and Washington policy makers enabled the former to move with alacrity when potentially embarrassing situations arose. Such a situation occurred in the early 1960s when it became public knowledge that the African-American Institute was funded almost exclusively by the CIA. Because the Institute served as a major clearinghouse for African students studying in the United States, and because the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford and Rockefeller foundations were closely identified with the Institute through board memberships and program subsidies, it was decided that deliberate action was required to place the funding base of the Institute on a more respectable footing. Without undue delay, representatives of the Corporation, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund agreed to underwrite the budget of the African-American Institute. They were subsequently joined in this effort by the AID and the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.¹⁰⁷ The coordination of the resources and activities of the foundations is illustrated by the convening of a conference at the Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in 1958. The conference, organized by Carnegie's Alan Pifer, brought together twenty-three representatives of some of the most important institutions concerned with Africa. The institutions included the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Department of State, the British Colonial Office, the International Cooperation Administration, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), several commercial firms with African interests, such as Mobil Oil, Unilever, and American Metal Climax, and several United States and British universities. In the words of one observer of this period, the assemblage represented "the most relevant American foundations, the key U.S. government aid agencies, and important American business and individual interests as well as a number of key Britons concerned with Africa."¹⁰⁸

Heyman notes that the primary purpose of the gathering was to devise programs which "themselves were to be based on the common interests of the African states and the free world nations, which interests the Greenbrier participants saw as new African states with political and economic viability, and friendship, or dependency on, the West."¹⁰⁹ Carnegie personnel claimed that the Corporation's interest in the conference was simply that of facilitator, that its impartial sponsorship of the gathering was "free from the motives other than a desire to serve the best interests of the Africans."¹¹⁰ This expression of disinterested humanitarianism was somewhat difficult to reconcile with Pifer's statement several months earlier, in a background paper for another Carnegie-sponsored conference, that "the basis of our concern with Africa in the future is going to be self-interest."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ Murphy, *Creative Philanthropy*, pp. 28-29; and Carl Spaeth to Cleon Swayzee, September 26, 1952. Ford Foundation, General Correspondence, 1952, Africa Conference file.

¹⁰⁷ Fox, Oral History Transcript, p. 205.

¹⁰⁸ Murphy, *Creative Philanthropy*, p. 60.

¹⁰⁹ Heyman, "The Role of Carnegie Corporation in African Education," pp. 177-178.

¹¹⁰ Quoted in Heyman, "Role of Carnegie Corporation in African Education," p. 178.

¹¹¹ Pifer background paper, May 14, 1957, CC.

One of the most significant outcomes of the Greenbrier conference was the creation of the Africa Liaison Committee, designed to serve as the agency through which many American proposals for work in higher education in Africa would be processed. Representatives of the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation frequently met with key individuals from the Committee to coordinate their evolving plans for African education. These cooperative efforts, which occasionally included the Rockefeller Foundation as well, resulted in numerous joint foundation activities in African education during the late 1950s and 1960s.

One of these was the creation of an organization called Education and World Affairs, which originated in a meeting of the presidents of the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and representatives of the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in 1959. The main purposes of this organization were the facilitation of communication "with agencies of government, business, and foundations in the United States, and with institutions of other nations (to further agreed-upon ends in the developing nations)," and the initiation of "research, conferences, publications, and other activities, all designed to strengthen the international dimensions of American universities."¹¹² Africa became important in the plans of Education and World Affairs, the funding and staffing of which were eventually assumed for the most part by the Ford Foundation.

The foundations also cooperated in the creation of the University of East Africa. In 1963 representatives of AID, the Africa Liaison Committee, and the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations met to formulate a strategy to present to the representatives of the three constituent East African institutions and other, particularly British, donor agencies. The conference on the needs of the University of East Africa was held at the Rockefeller Foundation villa at Bellagio, Italy, that same year. Representatives of the Africa Liaison Committee, AID, and the foundations were determined to force the creation of a regional university of East Africa, despite indications from the three governments concerned that they preferred to have autonomous universities within their own countries.¹¹³

Although the concept of a federated University of East Africa eventually foundered because of political problems among the three territories, the role played by the foundations in forging an outlook sympathetic to United States interests at the independent institutions was important. Carnegie's main emphasis was in the field of teacher education, Rockefeller's in the biological and social sciences, and Ford's in the social sciences and public administration. The leverage afforded the foundations by virtue of

¹¹² This initial purpose is quoted from the Ford-sponsored study entitled *The University and World Affairs* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1961), p. 77, in a memorandum from John B. Howard to McGeorge Bundy, Board of Trustees Docket Item, May 11, 1966. FF International Training and Research Papers, John B. Howard, file Education and World Affairs Grants. The second purpose is quoted in Murphy, *Creative Philanthropy*, p. 94.

¹¹³ Correspondence between Karl W. Bigelow and Carnegie's Alan Pifer, as well as communications among several individuals in other foundations, and the Agency for International Development corroborates this. See especially Bigelow to Pifer, August 12, 1963, and other materials contained in file at the Carnegie Corporation and entitled University of East Africa, 1961-63. For additional expressions of sentiments along these lines, see Cornelius de Kiewiet to Sir Donald MacGillivray, August 5, 1963. Box R100, folder 477, RFAC.

their coordinated strategy and funding patterns is suggested by Thompson's comment, that approximately 80 percent of the upper level administrative and professorial personnel at the University of East Africa had been supported by the Rockefeller Foundation for part or all of their professional training.

Conclusions: The Foundations, American Foreign Policy, and Constraints on African Development

There can be little doubt that the Ford Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, and Rockefeller Foundation have, since 1945, used their largesse to ensure the controlled growth and development of African societies through the strengthening of strategic cultural and political institutions, primarily through support for African education. This emphasis on education has had two advantages. First, the quantitative expansion of education in Africa has enabled foundation personnel to spread their common ideology across a great range of local societies. Secondly, the emphasis on the provision of a commodity which ostensibly has no political overtones, and which is in great demand, has enabled foundation personnel to appear in the guise of disinterested humanitarians. However, humanitarianism was not the major motivation for these foundation attempts to develop educational systems in Africa, despite the sympathies of some foundation personnel. Education was perceived as a means of ensuring a United States presence in those African nations considered of strategic and economic importance to the governing and business elites of the United States. The contention that United States foundation expenditures in Africa were designed primarily to benefit the recipients cannot be sustained. Rather, it was through African education that United States foundation personnel hoped to influence African development along lines acceptable to United States interests.

Foundation personnel could justify programs promoting United States interests at least as much as African interests because, from their perspective, the two were inseparable. This identification of African needs with United States interests derived from the manner in which the major foundations defined their functions and from their acceptance of the ideology of imperial liberalism. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation's charter stated broadly that the purpose of the Foundation was the promotion of human progress.¹¹⁴ If African needs could be served while United States interests were furthered, then certainly Foundation officers would keep faith with the intent of the charter, at least as they interpreted it. Likewise, the Ford Foundation's statement of purpose, drafted in 1949, described the strengthening of democracy and the establishment of peace as two cornerstones of Foundation activity.¹¹⁵ Thus the Ford Foundation could justify its involvement overseas by appealing to United States patriotism, by arguing that it, in concert with the governing and business elite in the United States, was developing programs to thwart communist aggression while strengthening democracy around the world. Vernon McKay, former foundation

¹¹⁴ This purpose was cited repeatedly in intra-office memoranda during the 1950s when Rockefeller Foundation officers were discussing the expansion of their programs into underdeveloped areas.

¹¹⁵ These areas are first specified in the so-called Gaither report of 1949, *Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation in Policy and Program* (Detroit: The Foundation, 1949), and repeated with some regularity in subsequent foundation publications.

operative, spokesman, and policy planner, summed up Africa's importance to the United States by noting that "if democracy is to flourish in the United States, free institutions must also continue to exist in other *less* fortunate parts of the world. That is why it is in our interest for Africa to remain free of Communist dictatorship. . . . The twin pillars of this kind of freedom are economic growth and educational progress. It is therefore in our national interest to strengthen these pillars."¹¹⁶ The overriding concern of the philanthropoids in Africa has been to train elites to govern their nations in ways guaranteed to maximize growth, political stability, and capitalist investment. The emphasis on the training of elites derived from American pluralist theory, which held, according to Rogin, that "the political actors in a stable democracy are elites not masses, and it is deference to these elites rather than faith in the people that permits effective and democratic government."¹¹⁷ The foundation grants for training programs at universities in the United States were attempts to nurture these African elites, to create "an international community of . . . elites, a 'world culture' in which modern (American) values became widely if not universally shared."¹¹⁸ These programs were made available to African leaders because socialization in American institutions would discourage, it was thought, flirtation with socialist models of development, a course which obviously was considered a threat to United States corporate and financial leaders.

No observer of the current African scene would deny the attempts—largely successful to date—by the Chinese and especially by the Soviets and the Cubans to influence Africans in various parts of the continent to take a sympathetic view of their respective socialist development models. At the same time, however, one must marvel at the disingenuousness behind the expressions of moral indignation emanating from Washington, as policy makers recognize that American influence is being countered in African areas important to the United States. Repeated statements from Washington officials would have the public believe that the United States does not currently, nor has it previously attempted to, exert undue influence on the developing nations of Africa. Such rhetoric ignores, of course, the significant, long-standing attempts by United States policy makers, working with foundation officials who shared their beliefs, to ensure the allegiance of Africans to the American-dominated corporate-capitalist system. While this is hardly the place to debate whether military intervention designed to win friends—as is the current case with the Chinese, Soviet, and Cuban undertakings in Africa—is more or less pernicious than cultural intervention to attain similar ends, we should not lose sight of the fact that both approaches consider the interests of the clients as of secondary importance to those of the outside powers.¹¹⁹

The many and tangible benefits which did accrue to Africans as a result of foundation expenditures were incidental outcomes. Chaliand puts the case rather baldly,

¹¹⁶ McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, p. 283.

¹¹⁷ Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), p. 275. See also the comments of Noam Chomsky in his *American Power and the New Mandarins* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 63: "Antagonism to mass movements and to social change that escapes the control of privileged elites is also a prominent feature of contemporary liberal ideology."

¹¹⁸ Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science, 1960-1970," *Journal of Development Studies*, 8 (1972), 365.

¹¹⁹ For an explication of this point, see Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice*.

arguing that American foreign aid in Africa "aims at reinforcing a leadership group linked by self-interest to Western capitalism."¹²⁰ For some time now there has been a growing recognition on the part of the African recipients that foundation and official aid programs were not necessarily designed to serve their best interests.¹²¹ This recognition perhaps helps to explain the perceived African antagonism toward foundation programs in East Africa. As one Rockefeller official complained to another in 1967: "I gather the impression that . . . the Africans don't like us and will be happy to see us go as soon as we can be replaced by their own kind, qualified or not. This feeling is not shared by all the Americans, only by the most perceptive ones." He concluded, with some chagrin, that "the Rockefeller Foundation contributions to East Africa have been substantial from our standpoint, but I am afraid, very little appreciated by the recipients. In short, I have the feeling that we are being had."¹²² What he failed to recognize was that the Africans perceived that foundation largesse was only a part of a larger, covert, attempt to mold Africans in ways beneficial to Western interests.

Africans have long reacted, generally in rather subtle but distinctly negative ways, to the repeated attempts by outsiders to manipulate them. Historically, these reactions have been characterized by well-considered African decisions to align themselves with yet other outside groups—African, Arab, European—in hopes of winning from these latter concessions unobtainable from the initial donor.¹²³ While African elites may collaborate with the foundations and other Western agencies to further ends that they perceive to be in their best interests, their past actions would indicate little reluctance in future to disassociate themselves from these agencies when such a course appears advantageous. The recent Chinese, Soviet, and Cuban "gains" and the concomitant Western "losses" in Africa should be evaluated with this in mind.

There is at present increasing concern among Africans that the priorities encouraged by outside donor agencies—foundations, official aid programs, the World

¹²⁰ Gerard Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World: Myths and Prospects* (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 27.

¹²¹ Although the public rhetoric of foreign aid has generally been couched in terms of humanitarian concern, foreign aid spokesmen have been more candid when discussing the issue amongst themselves. In a talk to the Council on Foreign Relations, later published as *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), Edward S. Mason stated that "to discuss foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy implies that aid programs are shaped with the interests of the aid-giving countries primarily in mind. I believe that, on balance, this is true" (p. 3). The extent to which foreign aid assistance benefits the donors at the expense of the recipient nations is indicated in an August 20, 1978, letter from C. W. Pickup to *The Times* (London): "Who benefits from aid" and foreign investment; he asks, before noting that "in 1975 official aid from OECD members to underdeveloped countries was \$13,585 million, of which \$12,000 million was returned to service debts . . ." and that "90 percent of United States aid ends up back in the U.S." He further notes that "estimates of the U.S. Department of Commerce for 1950 to 1965 indicate that the flow of capital on investment accounts from the U.S.A. to countries outside Europe and Canada was \$9,000 million, while \$25,600 million was the reverse flow of capital profits. This was a net flow from the poor to the rich of \$16,600 million." Additional arguments along these lines can be found in Teresa Hayter, *Aid as Imperialism* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1971); and Richard F. Devon, "Education and the Development of Underdevelopment, Comparative and International Education Society Newsletter, 47, April 1978, pp. 6-7.

¹²² Virgil C. Scott to J. M. Weir, March 16, 1967. Folder 900: Pro, Unar-6, RFNYC

¹²³ I have dealt at length with some of the numerous forms that these reactions have taken in my *African Reactions to Missionary Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1975).

Bank—have had a negative impact on African cultures as well as on the long-range prospects for development. Ironically, one of the most articulate spokesmen of their viewpoint was long a beneficiary of foundation largesse. Mazrui, for example, recognizes that “African universities were capable of being at once mechanisms for political liberation and agencies of cultural dependency.” This was so because “university graduates in Africa, precisely because they were the most deeply Westernized Africans, were the most culturally dependent.”¹²⁴ While the African university has indeed produced trained manpower to forward the development effort, it has at the same time helped to expand markets available to Western corporations by altering consumption patterns of African students and, through them, of African societies at large.¹²⁵ This was an intended outcome of a policy which considered African interests as secondary to the furtherance of the corporate-capitalist system. It is, in short, no accident that, in Miller’s words, “nothing radically different from the ‘free enterprise’ view of development is apparent.”¹²⁶ It remains to be seen, of course, if the current Chinese, Soviet, and Cuban influence in Africa will in the future be translated into alternative development models with a strong socialist flavor and which are ultimately controlled by the Africans for their benefit.

The unwillingness of Western interests to allow the possibility of alternative developmental models helps to explain the United States position in the recent Angolan civil war, and the promptness with which the United States government responded to the appeals by President Mobutu of Zaire for support against the “communist” invaders of Shaba province. The American Gulf Oil Company has significant interests in Angola, and Shaba province is rich in minerals considered of strategic value to the United States. When commenting on the importance of continued access to Shaba’s valuable resources at an earlier time of unrest, the president of Inland Steel Company ex-

¹²⁴ Ali A. Mazrui, “The African University as a Multinational Corporation: Problems of Penetration and Dependency,” *Harvard Educational Review*, 45 (1975), 194.

¹²⁵ An elaboration of this theme and a further indication of the futility of attempting to differentiate between the impact of foreign capital penetration and foreign cultural penetration on African development is provided by Thomas E. Weisskopf, “Capitalism, Underdevelopment and the Future of the Poor Countries,” in *Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s*, ed. Jagdish Bagwati (London: Macmillan, 1972). He notes that “international capitalism is especially threatening to the cultural autonomy of poor countries because of the strong interest that capitalist firms have in transmitting the kind of consumerist mentality that stimulates the market for their products. The same kind of demonstration effect that biases demand in poor countries in favor of foreign goods and services also serves to favor the import of foreign styles and fashions at the expense of domestic cultural autonomy. Just as a concentration of purchasing power in the hands of the elite classes accentuates the demand-bias so the dominance by the foreign-oriented elite—and other foreigners themselves—of educational institutions, communications media, and cultural resources tend to amplify the threat to indigenous cultural independence” (p. 50).

¹²⁶ Ralph M. Miller, “The Meaning of Development and Its Educational Implications,” in *Education and Development Reconsidered*, p. 83. This is echoed by the comments of Francis J. Method, “National Research and Developmental Capabilities in Education,” in *Education and Development Reconsidered*: “most assistance to basic education (mainly primary schools) has tended to foster development along conventional lines, strengthening the modern sector and preparing students for more education but doing little to support local change and to assist people with the problems of living outside the modern sector” (p. 137). See also the similar conclusions drawn from a study in India in Joseph De Bona, “The Development of Educational Underdevelopment in India,” *Asian Profile*, 5 (1977), 607-619.

claimed: "What a break for us that the mother country (Belgium) was on our side."¹²⁷ These and similar comments lend credence to the recent observation that "Shaba is not the victim of secessionist adventurism. It is a battleground for political and economic independence in Africa."¹²⁸ It is on just this battleground that the major American foundations have had such an impact. The Rockefeller Foundation's decision in the early 1970s to expand its University Development Program to include Zaire should be understood in this context.

The question now facing the independent African nations is, according to Mazrui, "whether modernization can be decolonized without being destroyed."¹²⁹ This will be difficult even if African leaders decide to opt for alternatives to the Western-oriented development models because of the degree to which the Western, foundation-sponsored model has been rooted in selected African nations. Already, according to Altbach, "Western methodological orientations, especially in the social sciences, have become entrenched in the Third World. . . . These new (educational institutions) serve American interests admirably; they are models of technologically oriented, non-political schools that often use American books and equipment."¹³⁰ This institutional implantation and its concomitant manipulative potential represents, in Gouldner's view, part of the "vast energies and resources (that) are expended in shaping what the nonruling class thinks."¹³¹ The difficulties faced by African nations in their attempts to reorient their educational institutions toward models more beneficial to the masses of their populations and less to foreign interests are, in large measure, a testimony to the success with which the major American foundations have pursued their work in African education since 1945.

¹²⁷ Clarence B. Randall, *The Communist Challenge to American Business* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 36.

¹²⁸ Johannes Fabian to the Editor of *The New York Times*, June 4, 1978. For insights into this conflict and more general comments on the relationships between the developing nations and the others, see Geoffrey Barraclough, "Waiting for the New Order," *The New York Review of Books*, October 26, 1978, pp. 45-53; and his "The Struggle for the Third World," *The New York Review of Books*, November 9, 1978, pp. 47-58.

¹²⁹ Mazrui, "The African University as a Multinational Corporation," p. 200.

¹³⁰ Philip G. Altbach, "Servitude of the Mind? Education Dependency and Neocolonialism" *Teachers College Record*, 79 (1977), 197-198.

¹³¹ Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology*, p. 231.

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